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PROGRAMME ARCHITECTURE AND DELIVERY MODEL

THE STRUCTURE FOR UNIFIED ALLIANCE FOR SOCIAL EQUITY



CREATED BY

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Care to Change the World



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Programme Architecture and Delivery Model

Chapter 1 — The Six-Programme Structure

UASE shall operate as a unified alliance of six constituent programmes organised within a single top-level institutional framework and governed by a common constitutional, fiduciary and strategic order. The purpose of this structure is not merely administrative. It is to convert the wider doctrine that now sits across the Creativa architecture — including the WOSL Group, GSEA, GSIA, GSDA, GSCA, the legacy projects, private-sector mobilisation, charity as a business, Agenda for Social Equity, and the implementation mandate associated with Agenda 74 Agency — into a durable operating form capable of execution, capital absorption, disciplined scaling and long-term maintenance.

The six-programme structure is therefore to be understood as the principal operating architecture of UASE. It is the means by which UASE becomes governable at scale without becoming bloated, fragmented or thematically incoherent. The programmes are not intended to function as ordinary internal departments, thematic desks or administrative subdivisions. On the contrary, each programme shall be constituted as a relatively self-autonomous programme-entity within the wider alliance, possessing its own mandate expression, strategic logic, delivery pathways, programme leadership, partner ecosystem, pipeline discipline and performance accountability, while remaining subject to the common constitutional and fiduciary order of UASE as a whole.

This distinction is fundamental. UASE is one alliance, but it is not one undifferentiated machine. Its design requires coherent unity at the top and disciplined autonomy below. Each programme must be sufficiently independent to originate, structure, develop and manage its own field of action with credibility, continuity and specialist competence. At the same time, none of the programmes shall constitute an independent sovereign institution detached from the UASE whole, nor shall any programme be permitted to develop a parallel constitutional order, treasury regime, external identity system or governance doctrine inconsistent with the central framework.

The six programmes of UASE shall be as follows.

UASE code	Working title	Formal long title	Primary institutional field
UASE-FP	Food Programme	Food Systems and Rural Prosperity Programme	Food systems, rural productivity, staple food architecture, agro-industrial inclusion and rural prosperity pathways
UASE-DP	Digital Programme	Digital Public Systems Programme	Digital public systems, public-interest digital enablement, systems integration and institutional digital transition
UASE-IP	Infrastructure Programme	Infrastructure, Utilities and Settlements Programme	Physical infrastructure, utilities, modular settlements, service environments and place-based delivery platforms



UASE-MP	Markets Programme	Markets, Enterprise and Value Chains Programme	Enterprise activation, productive inclusion, market access, trade pathways, value chains and MSME participation
UASE-SP	Skills Programme	Skills, Applied Education and Workforce Transition Programme	Applied education, skills systems, workforce transition, vocational pathways and capability formation
UASE-CP	Capital Programme	Project Preparation, Catalytic Finance and Local Capital Mobilisation Programme	Project preparation, catalytic capital, finance structuring, local capital mobilisation and bankability architecture

These six programmes shall together constitute the full first-order programme architecture of UASE. No seventh programme shall be implied merely because a thematic opportunity emerges, and no temporary project cluster shall be allowed to drift into quasi-programme status by practice alone. If expansion later becomes necessary, such expansion must occur through the formal rules on programme extension and transfer set out elsewhere in the present document. The discipline of the six-programme architecture is itself part of the institutional doctrine.

The structure has been designed so that UASE can cover a wide public-purpose field without replicating the sprawling fragmentation often seen in legacy multilateral systems. The six programmes provide sufficient breadth to undertake real economy work across food systems, digital systems, infrastructure, markets, skills and capital formation, but they do so through a compressed and intelligible architecture. The result is not thematic thinness, but mandate concentration. Each programme carries a large enough field to be institutionally meaningful and commercially legible, while remaining clear enough to avoid bureaucratic duplication.

The operative principle shall therefore be one of federated programme autonomy under central constitutional discipline. In practical terms, this means that each programme may and should be developed as a recognisable operational pillar capable of maintaining its own strategic plans, country or regional pipelines, partner relationships, implementation methodologies and sector-specific business logic. Each may have designated leadership, approved staffing structures, programme budgets, delegated contracting authority within approved thresholds, and its own organisation book or equivalent formal planning instrument. Each may also develop specialist methods, templates and operating models appropriate to its field, provided that such instruments remain consistent with UASE-wide law, policy, standards and reserved matters.

For the avoidance of doubt, each programme shall be treated as a distinct programme-entity and not as a mere sub-office of the secretariat. A programme may therefore operate with a degree of institutional personality in practical, commercial and strategic terms, even where formal legal personality continues to rest with UASE centrally or with an authorised UASE vehicle. The intention is that the outside world, including governments, private actors, implementing partners and co-investors, must be able to engage a programme as a serious and stable counterpart in its own right, while still understanding that the programme forms part of the wider UASE alliance.

This relative autonomy is not unconditional. The central spine of UASE shall retain authority over reserved matters essential to institutional coherence and public integrity. Such reserved matters shall include the constitutional doctrine of UASE, institutional identity and naming rules, financial control



architecture, treasury and reserve policy, risk and safeguard standards, audit and accountability systems, legal formation policy, compacting rules, data and reporting standards, anti-capture protections, and any decision that materially alters the mandate perimeter or external obligations of UASE. A programme may be autonomous in operation, but it shall not be autonomous in constitutional direction.

The relationship between the programmes and the centre should therefore be understood through a simple distinction. The centre exists to preserve order, discipline, trust, legitimacy and interoperability. The programmes exist to carry sectoral action, project development, delivery logic and field execution. Where the centre overreaches, the alliance becomes slow and over-administered. Where the programmes overreach, the alliance becomes fragmented and internally competitive. The present model is intended to avoid both failures.

In institutional terms, the six programmes shall be regarded as the principal channels through which UASE engages the external world. Country engagements, regional compacts, project pipelines and co-investment structures shall ordinarily be carried through one or more programmes, rather than through a free-floating corporate centre. The centre shall coordinate, authorize, safeguard and support. The programmes shall originate, translate and deliver. This division is central to the operating thesis of UASE.

The six-programme structure also serves an important developmental purpose. It allows UASE to mature without requiring immediate legal separation of every specialist function. In the early and middle phases of institutional build-out, the programmes may sit within one common legal and governance shell while already behaving as disciplined operational entities. Over time, where scale, jurisdiction, investment logic or compact terms require more differentiated institutional arrangements, a programme or part of a programme may be separately constituted, ring-fenced or regionally expressed under approved UASE rules. The architecture therefore supports both present coherence and future institutional maturation.

In consequence, all future programme design, organisational planning, budget allocation, staffing, partner mapping and project classification within UASE shall proceed on the basis that the alliance consists of six relatively self-autonomous programme-entities held together by one central constitutional and operational spine. That principle shall govern interpretation of this document and all derivative manuals, organisation books and implementation instruments.

Chapter 2 — Programme Boundaries and Non-Duplication Rules

The six-programme structure can only function if programme boundaries are real, disciplined and enforceable. UASE is not being established to reproduce the familiar disorder in which multiple institutions, units or funding channels claim overlapping mandates, compete for the same space, duplicate one another's work, or obscure responsibility through joint ownership that in practice belongs to no one. The non-duplication principle is therefore not an administrative preference. It is a constitutional operating rule of UASE.

Each programme shall have a primary mandate perimeter. That perimeter is the field in which the programme is entitled, and expected, to lead. Other programmes may support, interface, co-design or co-finance matters that touch that field, but they shall not displace the lead programme, market themselves as the principal home of that same field, or develop parallel product lines that substantially replicate the authorised scope of another programme. UASE shall proceed on the basis that one matter must have one accountable lead, even where several programmes contribute.



Programme boundaries shall be determined according to the dominant public-purpose and delivery logic of the matter in question. The question is not merely which technologies are present, which funding source is available, or which institution first encountered the opportunity. The question is which programme’s primary mandate is most directly engaged by the principal problem to be solved, the core asset or system to be established, the main counterpart to be served, and the central result to be measured. Once that assessment has been made, a lead programme shall be designated and recorded.

The following boundary table sets out the primary lead domains of each programme and the principal non-duplication guardrails to be observed.

Programme	Primary lead domain	Matters it may support but should not absorb as lead without approval	Core non-duplication rule
UASE-FP	Food systems, staple food security, rural productivity, agro-value systems and rural prosperity structures	Digital layers for agriculture, logistics infrastructure, workforce training, catalytic finance	No other programme shall establish a parallel food-systems delivery platform where the principal outcome is agricultural or rural prosperity
UASE-DP	Digital public systems, interoperability, institutional digitalisation, public-interest systems architecture	Sector-specific digital components embedded in food, skills, infrastructure or markets work	No other programme shall claim lead on digital public systems merely because digital tools are embedded in its sectoral work
UASE-IP	Infrastructure, utilities, settlements, physical service platforms and place-based delivery environments	Productive assets linked to food systems, market facilities, digital hardware layers, training facilities	No other programme shall lead on core utility or settlement infrastructure where the principal asset is physical and service-environmental
UASE-MP	Enterprise development, market activation, trade linkage, value chains and productive participation	Sector-linked business development in food, skills-related placement pathways, finance mobilisation	No other programme shall establish a duplicative enterprise and value-chain platform where the central outcome is market participation or business activation
UASE-SP	Skills systems, vocational transition, applied education, workforce capability and labour-market readiness	Training attached to digital, food, infrastructure or markets projects	No other programme shall lead on workforce transition or applied education merely because training forms a component of a broader project



UASE-CP	Project preparation, finance structuring, catalytic capital, bankability and local capital mobilisation	Sectoral investment opportunities in any of the five other programmes	No other programme shall create a parallel finance-structuring or catalytic capital platform outside the approved capital architecture of UASE
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These boundaries are to be interpreted strictly but not mechanically. UASE is an integrated alliance, and real-world projects will frequently involve more than one programme. A food systems initiative may require irrigation, power, logistics, digital traceability, training and capital structuring. A digital public systems initiative may involve connectivity, facilities, local skills development and procurement support. A market activation platform may require both infrastructure and workforce preparation. The existence of such interdependence does not dissolve the boundary rules. It confirms their necessity.

The rule shall therefore be as follows: where multiple programmes are engaged, one programme must still hold the lead mandate, and all other participating programmes shall enter as supporting, enabling, interfacing or co-delivering entities under clearly defined scope. Joint activity is permitted. Dual ownership is not. UASE shall not permit situations in which the same external opportunity is internally described as belonging equally to several programmes if that has the effect of weakening accountability or multiplying administrative touchpoints.

In determining lead ownership, the following interpretive tests shall apply. First, the dominant outcome test shall identify the principal public-purpose result for which the intervention exists. Secondly, the counterpart test shall identify the main institutional or market actor whose problem UASE is principally addressing. Thirdly, the asset or system test shall identify the core system, platform, service environment or institutional capability being created or reformed. Fourthly, the revenue and risk test shall identify where the main implementation exposure, commercial logic or capital structuring responsibility sits. These tests should ordinarily point in the same direction. Where they do not, the matter shall be escalated for formal classification.

A further rule follows from this structure. A programme may develop specialist tools, methodologies and engagement models relevant to its mandate, but it may not use incidental overlap as a basis for territorial expansion into another programme’s field. For example, UASE-FP may include digital tools in food systems work, but it may not on that basis become a general digital public systems platform. UASE-SP may develop training modules attached to infrastructure projects, but it may not on that basis absorb the infrastructure mandate. UASE-MP may support enterprise participation in food or infrastructure value chains, but it may not reconstitute the sectoral delivery logic of those programmes under a market label. UASE-CP may structure finance across the alliance, but it may not replace the subject-matter responsibility of the delivery programme whose project is being prepared or financed.

The non-duplication rule also applies to branding, partner engagement and pipeline formation. No programme shall market a service line externally if that service line properly belongs within the primary mandate of another programme, unless a formal cross-programme arrangement has been approved. No programme shall independently onboard a strategic partner into a field already assigned to another programme without coordination and documented allocation of roles. No programme shall build a hidden parallel pipeline by reclassifying sectoral work under broader language such as innovation, systems change, local development or institutional support if the substantive mandate lies elsewhere. Such practices are inconsistent with UASE discipline and shall be treated as boundary violations.



Where overlap or ambiguity arises, the matter shall first be addressed through programme-to-programme clarification under the authority of the relevant executives. If unresolved, the matter shall be referred to the UASE central spine for classification. The central determination shall be recorded and shall govern future treatment of comparable matters unless later amended. Repeat ambiguity in a given field shall trigger a formal boundary note or operating circular so that classification becomes progressively more stable over time.

It is also necessary to distinguish between duplication and shared contribution. Shared contribution is lawful and often desirable where one programme supplies a defined capability into another programme's lead intervention. Duplication arises only where multiple programmes claim substantially the same lead mandate, develop competing ownership structures, or create parallel institutional pathways for the same class of work. UASE encourages the former and prohibits the latter. The difference must be understood clearly across all planning, business development and implementation work.

The purpose of these rules is not to create silos. The purpose is to preserve intelligibility, accountability and strategic economy. In a system built to mobilise private capital, engage public counterparts, structure complex partnerships and maintain long-term credibility, it must always be clear which programme owns the matter, which programmes support it, which standards apply, and where responsibility ultimately lies. If UASE fails on this point, it risks reproducing the very institutional drag it is intended to overcome.

Accordingly, the six-programme model shall be applied on the basis that programme identity is real, lead mandate is singular, support roles are defined, and institutional duplication is prohibited unless expressly authorised through formal expansion, transfer or restructuring rules. This discipline is one of the conditions by which UASE remains lean, governable and investable.

Chapter 3 — Country and Regional Compacting Model

UASE shall engage jurisdictions, public authorities, regional groupings and approved territorial platforms through a structured compacting model designed to preserve strategic coherence at alliance level while allowing programme-specific operation at the level where implementation must actually occur. The compacting model is therefore the principal bridge between the constitutional architecture of UASE and its practical field expression. It is the legal and operational method through which the six programmes may enter countries, regions and cross-border spaces without dissolving into a loose collection of unrelated projects or becoming trapped in a purely centralised negotiation model.

The first principle of the compacting model shall be that UASE enters territory through authorised compact instruments and not through informal thematic expansion, ad hoc promises or programme-level improvisation. No programme, however capable or commercially advanced, shall treat a jurisdiction as effectively opened merely because relationships exist, preliminary opportunities have been discussed, or technical scoping has started. Entry into a country or region must be recognised through a defined compacting pathway, whether preliminary, interim, partial or full. This is necessary both to protect institutional legitimacy and to ensure that programme activity rests on a disciplined mandate base rather than on transactional opportunism.

The second principle shall be that compacting may occur at more than one territorial level. UASE may compact with a sovereign state, a ministry cluster, a regional economic community, a province or state structure, a metropolitan authority, a corridor platform, a special-purpose public vehicle or another institution recognised by UASE as competent to host, support or enable implementation. The



appropriate level shall depend on constitutional practicality, implementation logic, legal openness, capital readiness and the degree to which the counterpart can support continuity beyond a single project cycle. UASE is not required to force all relationships into the classic state-to-institution model if another territorial or institutional form offers a more durable basis for lawful and accountable execution.

The compacting model shall also distinguish between the alliance level and the programme level. UASE as a top organisation may enter an umbrella compact that establishes the overall basis for cooperation, territorial presence, mutual recognition, strategic objectives, enabling conditions and priority fields. Within that umbrella, one or more of the six programmes may then be designated as the operative channels for actual development, preparation and execution. This permits UASE to appear externally as one coherent institution while ensuring that the substantive work is carried by the programme-entities best suited to the matter in question.

At the same time, the relative autonomy of the programmes must be preserved. A programme should not be forced to negotiate all implementation terms through a central corporate interface if the country relationship is substantively grounded in that programme's own mandate, technical specialism and delivery pathway. Accordingly, once a jurisdiction or territory is opened through an approved compacting route, the relevant programme or programmes may operate under delegated compact authority within the limits of the umbrella instrument and the reserved powers of the UASE central spine. In this way, the compacting model protects both unity and functional self-government. The centre authorises the space; the programme occupies it.

The compacting model shall ordinarily be expressed through four layers of engagement. The first is strategic recognition, by which a country, regional body or other qualifying authority acknowledges UASE as an admissible or preferred cooperation platform across one or more programme domains. The second is framework compacting, by which the parties record principles, scope, governance channels, priority areas and enabling conditions. The third is programme compacting, by which one or more UASE programmes obtain an operational mandate to develop pipelines, structure interventions or support implementation in the territory concerned. The fourth is project or transaction compacting, by which particular initiatives, facilities, transactions, concessions, preparation mandates or delivery assignments are formally constituted.

These layers may be sequenced strictly, but they need not always be. In some cases, a jurisdiction may begin with a project-specific entry point which later evolves into a broader programme compact and ultimately into an umbrella alliance arrangement. In other cases, a top-level framework may be concluded first, followed by phased activation of the programmes as readiness, funding and counterpart maturity improve. The compacting model is therefore staged, but not rigid. It must support real-world entry while maintaining institutional order.

The following table provides the principal compact forms that may be used within the UASE system.

Compact form	Primary purpose	Typical counterpart	Institutional effect
Strategic Recognition Instrument	To acknowledge UASE as an admissible alliance and identify priority domains for engagement	State authority, REC, ministry cluster, city-region authority, public mandate entity	Opens a recognised relationship but does not by itself authorise programme execution



Framework Compact	To establish the general basis for cooperation, territorial scope, governance channels and enabling conditions	Sovereign government, REC, public agency consortium, approved territorial platform	Creates the umbrella basis under which one or more programmes may later operate
Programme Compact	To authorise a specific UASE programme to originate, prepare, develop or support delivery within a defined field	Ministry, implementing agency, REC technical body, city or regional authority, programme host entity	Confers programme-level operating space within the approved compact perimeter
Project or Transaction Instrument	To establish a specific project, preparation mandate, facility, procurement, concession or investment pathway	Public authority, SPV, operator, investor consortium, anchor partner, implementation vehicle	Converts programme authority into a specific executable assignment or structure

The compacting model shall be guided by a rule of territorial seriousness. UASE shall not scatter token engagements merely to create the appearance of footprint. A country or region shall be treated as active within UASE only where there is a sufficient combination of legal openness, counterpart credibility, implementation need, programme fit, capital realism and delivery potential. Compacting is not diplomatic decoration. It is an authorising act that should ordinarily lead, within a reasonable period, to pipeline formation, preparation activity, delivery architecture or strategic institutional embedding.

There shall also be a distinction between full compact jurisdictions and programme-specific jurisdictions. A full compact jurisdiction is one in which UASE as a top organisation has an umbrella basis for multi-programme activity or future expansion across the alliance. A programme-specific jurisdiction is one in which a particular programme has secured a lawful and operational basis for work without the entire alliance necessarily being activated. Both are valid. The important point is that the distinction is recorded and respected. Programme-specific entry shall not be misdescribed as full alliance entry, and alliance-level recognition shall not be taken to mean that every programme is automatically authorised to operate in that territory.

The country and regional compacting model must also accommodate regionalisation. UASE is not intended to become trapped within a purely national logic, especially where value chains, digital systems, capital flows, transport corridors, food systems, utilities or labour transitions are inherently cross-border. UASE may therefore compact at REC level, corridor level, river basin level, customs area level, island cluster level or other functionally coherent territorial level where the problem and the delivery pathway justify such treatment. In those cases, a regional compact may coexist with national implementing arrangements, provided that legal hierarchy, reporting and accountability are kept clear.

Where regional compacting is used, the role of the programmes becomes even more important. It is often at programme level that regional logic can be translated into practical pipelines. A regional food compact may produce national staple food interventions. A regional digital compact may support interoperable public systems across several jurisdictions. A regional capital compact may mobilise



structured preparation and co-investment for multiple territories under one financial architecture. The programmes are therefore not merely beneficiaries of compacting; they are its substantive carriers.

To preserve order, every compact shall specify at minimum the territorial scope, the relevant UASE programme or programmes, the lead counterparts, the status of legal authority, the governance channel for oversight, the reporting line into the UASE central spine, the applicable safeguards and integrity standards, and the route by which specific projects or transactions may be developed. Compacts that fail to identify these matters shall be treated as preliminary instruments only and may not be relied upon for major operational commitments.

A further rule shall apply in order to preserve programme autonomy. Where a territory is opened primarily through one programme, that programme shall not lose its lead position merely because a second programme later becomes active within the same jurisdiction. The original programme remains the lead for its own mandate field unless formally varied. Territorial presence does not erase mandate ownership. Likewise, where an umbrella compact exists, the centre may coordinate cross-programme alignment, but it shall not unnecessarily centralise relationships that are better managed by the programme-entities themselves under approved delegation.

The compacting model shall therefore operate as a layered system of lawful entry, territorial recognition and delegated programme action. It allows UASE to engage governments, regional bodies and other competent authorities through a single alliance architecture while ensuring that the six programmes remain operationally real, strategically legible and sufficiently self-autonomous to perform their functions as serious programme-entities. It is through this model that UASE can scale geographically without becoming either a loose federation of unrelated units or an over-centralised institution incapable of practical delivery.

Chapter 4 — Project Origination, Preparation and Execution Flow

UASE shall operate a disciplined project flow that begins with origination, passes through structured preparation, and proceeds to execution only when mandate fit, institutional ownership, partner alignment, capital logic and delivery readiness have been sufficiently established. This flow is not to be understood as a bureaucratic sequence for its own sake. It is the principal operating safeguard through which UASE converts strategic intent into executable action without reproducing the waste, drift, duplication and premature commitments that commonly arise where projects are accepted before they are properly classified, structured or financed.

The project flow shall apply across all six programmes, although each programme may maintain field-specific methods, templates and technical standards consistent with its specialist domain. The existence of programme autonomy does not remove the need for a shared alliance-wide discipline. On the contrary, because the programmes are intended to function as relatively self-autonomous programme-entities, a common flow is necessary to ensure that project quality, risk treatment, compact compliance, approval logic and reporting discipline remain intelligible across the alliance.

Every project, pipeline opportunity, strategic transaction or major delivery assignment entering UASE shall pass through five principal phases: origination, classification, preparation, commitment and execution. These phases may in practice contain sub-steps and iteration loops, but the overall logic shall remain constant. An opportunity must first be identified and entered; it must then be assigned to the correct programme and territorial pathway; it must then be prepared into an actionable proposition; it must then receive the approvals required for commitment; and only thereafter may it proceed into formal execution.



The origination phase begins when a potential opportunity is first presented to UASE or identified by one of its programmes. The source may be a government request, a regional mandate, an internal pipeline effort, a private-sector proposal, a capital partner, a strategic anchor relationship, a field reconnaissance exercise or a cross-programme initiative. At this stage, the purpose is not yet to promise delivery. It is to capture the opportunity, verify that it falls within the admissible perimeter of UASE, and establish whether there is sufficient seriousness to justify internal attention.

No project shall be treated as originated merely because it is thematically attractive. An originating opportunity must meet at least the minimum threshold of mandate relevance, territorial plausibility, counterpart credibility and preliminary implementation logic. UASE shall not accumulate speculative concepts in a manner that distorts pipeline quality or creates false institutional expectations. The origination gate is therefore the first discipline point. It exists to ensure that scarce programme attention is directed toward matters capable of maturing into compactable and deliverable propositions.

Once originated, the matter shall move to classification. Classification is the stage at which UASE determines the lead programme, the supporting programmes if any, the territorial compact route, the likely delivery modality, the indicative capital logic and the level of internal handling required. This phase is particularly important because many project failures begin with misclassification. A project framed initially as a digital matter may in truth be an infrastructure-led service platform. A market access opportunity may in practice be a food systems intervention with enterprise features. A capital request may not belong in the Capital Programme as lead if the real issue is weak project design in another programme. Correct classification is therefore a legal and operational necessity.

Where the matter clearly belongs within one programme, that programme shall become lead owner and shall assume responsibility for further development. Where several programmes are involved, one programme shall still be designated lead, with the others recorded as supporting or interfacing entities. The principles laid down in the non-duplication chapter shall govern this determination. If classification is unclear or disputed, the matter shall be escalated to the central spine for decision. No material preparation work should continue under ambiguous ownership beyond the point reasonably necessary to decide classification.

After classification, the matter proceeds to preparation. Preparation is the decisive phase in the UASE delivery model. It is the stage at which a raw opportunity is converted into an executable proposition with sufficient institutional, technical, legal, financial and partner discipline to support commitment. The depth of preparation shall be proportionate to the size, risk and complexity of the matter. Some interventions may require only modest design work, straightforward procurement logic and simple counterpart arrangements. Others may require extensive feasibility work, legal structuring, safeguard review, finance architecture, land and utility analysis, stakeholder mapping, transaction design, implementation sequencing and blended delivery arrangements.

Preparation shall ordinarily include the following elements, to the extent relevant: mandate confirmation, compact verification, lead and support role confirmation, counterpart mapping, problem definition, result logic, delivery modality selection, risk screening, safeguard screening, financial logic, preliminary affordability analysis, legal pathway analysis, local content considerations, jobs implications, procurement implications, implementation route design, reporting requirements and proposed approval thresholds. Each programme may supplement these elements with sector-specific methods, but none may omit the core disciplines merely because the matter appears commercially urgent.



The preparation phase is also where UASE must determine what kind of project it is actually preparing. Some matters will proceed as internally supported programme interventions. Others will become co-investment structures, concessions, service contracts, operating platforms, project preparation mandates, advisory assignments, capital mobilisation efforts, or multi-party implementation arrangements. UASE shall not use one generic project logic for all such matters. The preparation process must identify the true form of the intervention so that the correct legal, financial and operational path can be applied.

At this stage, the role of the Capital Programme deserves particular attention. UASE-CP may assist any of the other programmes by structuring project preparation, finance pathways, bankability enhancement, catalytic instruments and investor alignment. However, UASE-CP does not displace the substantive leadership of the delivery programme. A food systems project remains led by UASE-FP even where UASE-CP structures its catalytic finance. A digital public systems platform remains led by UASE-DP even where a finance facility is required. The preparation flow must therefore preserve the distinction between subject-matter ownership and capital support.

Once the preparation package has reached the standard appropriate to the matter, it moves to commitment. Commitment is the point at which UASE decides whether to proceed into a binding or operational phase. Depending on the case, commitment may take the form of project approval, signature authority, financial close approval, procurement authorisation, programme launch approval, transaction mandate approval, compact activation or another formal act recognised under UASE rules. No execution activity involving material obligations, public positioning, procurement exposure or funding commitment shall commence without the level of approval required for that class of matter.

The commitment phase shall also confirm the execution architecture. It must be clear whether UASE itself is implementing directly, whether a programme-specific vehicle is involved, whether partners or contractors will perform core execution roles, whether public authorities retain implementation functions, and how reporting, controls and escalation will operate. It must also be clear whether the intervention remains within a pilot phase, has moved into scaled execution, or is being established as a standing platform. Commitment without execution architecture is not valid commitment. It is merely aspiration formalised.

Only after commitment may the matter proceed into execution. Execution is the stage at which the project, transaction or programme assignment enters operational life. This may involve delivery, procurement, partner mobilisation, transaction closing, construction, systems deployment, service rollout, training, market activation, operating support, monitoring, corrective management and phased scale-up. The lead programme shall remain accountable for execution discipline within its mandate field, even where multiple actors are involved in practice. Support programmes shall contribute according to the approved role design and shall not reopen mandate ownership under cover of execution complexity.

Execution shall not be understood as the end of discipline. UASE shall operate the execution phase as a managed continuation of the earlier project flow. Changes in scope, major risk events, partner failure, affordability stress, legal obstacles, safeguard escalation or capital shortfall shall trigger structured review and, where necessary, re-approval. A matter that has entered execution remains subject to the constitutional and fiduciary order of UASE. Programme autonomy does not authorise uncontrolled adaptation once commitments have been made.



The project flow may be summarised as follows.

Phase	Principal question	Lead responsibility	Core output
Origination	Is this a serious admissible opportunity for UASE?	Relevant programme or authorised originating unit	Registered opportunity with preliminary admissibility view
Classification	Which programme owns it, through what territorial path, and with what support structure?	Relevant programme, with central-spine resolution where required	Confirmed lead ownership and routing decision
Preparation	Can this be converted into an executable, financeable and governable proposition?	Lead programme, with supporting programmes and central functions as needed	Structured preparation package
Commitment	Has the matter met the threshold for formal approval and operational entry?	Approving authority under UASE rules	Authorised commitment and execution architecture
Execution	Can the approved matter be delivered with discipline, controls and adaptive management?	Lead programme with approved delivery actors	Operating intervention under monitored implementation

This flow must also be read together with the compacting model. A project cannot move properly through origination, preparation and execution if the territorial basis for action is absent or unclear. Likewise, a compact without project flow discipline risks becoming ceremonial rather than productive. The two chapters are therefore mutually reinforcing. Compacting opens lawful and strategic space; project flow converts that space into concrete and governable action.

The project origination, preparation and execution flow is accordingly one of the principal mechanisms by which UASE retains seriousness as an alliance of relatively self-autonomous programme-entities. It gives each programme sufficient room to develop and carry its own pipeline while obliging all programmes to follow a common discipline that preserves coherence, accountability, investability and execution quality across the whole institution. That is indispensable if UASE is to become not merely an umbrella idea, but a functioning top organisation maintained through repeatable delivery.

Chapter 5 — Delivery Modalities and Partner Typologies

Within the six-programme architecture of UASE, delivery shall not be treated as a single mechanical model applied uniformly across all sectors, territories and counterpart settings. It shall instead be governed as a structured family of lawful delivery modalities through which the alliance, and the relatively self-autonomous programmes within it, may originate, prepare, execute, supervise or enable interventions in a manner proportionate to mandate, risk, capital logic and operational reality.

This chapter proceeds from a central institutional premise. UASE is not being constituted merely to advise, convene or publish. It is intended to function as an execution-capable alliance. At the same



time, it is not intended to become a monolithic operator that insists on direct control of every asset, contract, implementation team or local delivery pathway. The correct doctrine is therefore neither passive coordination nor indiscriminate operational absorption. It is disciplined modality selection. UASE must be able to determine, in each case, the form of delivery most consistent with public purpose, affordability, execution quality, partner capability, local ownership and institutional integrity.

The first rule shall accordingly be that every approved intervention must have a defined delivery modality before commitment. No project, programme platform, transaction structure or territorial intervention may proceed on the vague assumption that delivery arrangements will become clear later. Delivery ambiguity is itself a material risk. It weakens accountability, confuses partner expectations, distorts staffing, complicates finance structuring and often produces either over-centralisation or unmanaged fragmentation. A matter cannot properly be said to be ready for commitment unless it is also clear who is to do what, under which authority, at what level of risk, with what degree of UASE control, and under what contractual or compact basis.

The second rule shall be that modality selection belongs first to the lead programme, but not to the lead programme alone. Because each programme is intended to operate as a relatively self-autonomous programme-entity, the lead programme must have the authority to assess what delivery form is realistic for its field, counterpart and pipeline. Yet modality selection also engages reserved matters of legal structure, treasury exposure, integrity risk, procurement logic and institutional reputation. It therefore remains subject to review, challenge and approval through the UASE central spine where thresholds, sensitivities or cross-programme implications so require.

Delivery modalities under UASE shall be grouped into a limited number of recognised forms. These forms may be adapted in particular cases, but they shall not be multiplied unnecessarily. The alliance must remain clear enough, both internally and externally, for governments, private partners, investors and implementation actors to understand how UASE works in practice. The principal delivery modalities shall be as follows.

Delivery modality	General description	Typical lead role of UASE	Typical use case
Direct Programme Delivery	The lead programme delivers core design, oversight and selected implementation functions itself, using internal staff, approved contractors and delegated support services	High strategic and operational control by the lead programme	Early-stage institutional platforms, technical assistance, programme management, structured pilot phases, capability transfer environments
Counterpart-Led Delivery with UASE Programme Support	A public or institutional counterpart leads formal implementation while UASE provides design, preparation, quality control, capacity support, transaction support or execution management services	Shared delivery environment with strong counterpart ownership	Sovereign or ministerial programmes, public-system reform, national rollout requiring state ownership, regulated public service environments



Operator or Concession Delivery	UASE structures or supervises a delivery model under which an operator, concessionaire or service entity performs defined functions under contract or concession terms	UASE acts as structurer, supervisor, quality authority or co-governing institution	Utilities, service platforms, facilities management, modular infrastructure, long-term operating systems
Special Purpose Vehicle or Structured Platform Delivery	Delivery is routed through a ring-fenced vehicle, programme company, project SPV, platform entity or similar structure authorised under UASE rules	UASE may sponsor, govern, supervise or co-control the vehicle depending on structure	Asset-based projects, pooled facilities, multi-party co-investment structures, programme platforms requiring legal separation
Advisory, Preparation or Transaction Delivery	UASE performs preparation, structuring, bankability, compacting, procurement support or transaction design without itself becoming the long-term implementer	UASE acts as originator, preparer, arranger or programme architect	Pipeline development, catalytic finance, project preparation facilities, government support mandates, transaction mandates
Ecosystem or Partner-Network Delivery	Delivery is carried by a managed network of approved partners acting within a UASE-defined framework, standard or platform logic	UASE acts as orchestrator, standard-setter, quality gate and performance supervisor	Multi-local rollouts, workforce ecosystems, enterprise activation platforms, distributed service environments
Hybrid Delivery	Two or more recognised modalities are combined under one approved structure with clear allocation of roles	UASE role varies by workstream	Large multi-sector interventions, territorial platforms, phased programmes that move from direct preparation to counterpart or operator delivery

The recognised modalities are not equal in all cases. Some sectors will more naturally align with certain modalities than others. UASE-DP may often require counterpart-led or platform-based delivery because digital public systems ordinarily rely on institutional adoption by public actors. UASE-IP may frequently require operator, concession or SPV structures because physical infrastructure and utilities carry long-term asset and service obligations. UASE-FP may use mixed models in which programme design, private operators, farmer-facing structures and public-enabling functions coexist. UASE-SP may often combine direct programme design with ecosystem delivery through training providers, employers and local institutions. UASE-MP may rely heavily on network, platform and enterprise partnership models. UASE-CP will often function through advisory, structuring and transaction delivery rather than by assuming substantive implementation responsibility for sector operations. None of this, however, changes the rule that one lead programme must remain clearly accountable for the intervention as a whole.



The correct delivery modality shall be selected by reference to a defined set of tests. The first is the mandate test: which form best preserves the substantive purpose of the intervention and the authority of the lead programme? The second is the counterpart capability test: is the public, private or mixed counterpart capable of responsibly carrying the functions assigned to it? The third is the control test: how much direct UASE control is necessary to protect quality, legality, safeguards, bankability and public credibility? The fourth is the affordability test: can the chosen modality be sustained without producing a delivery architecture that is too expensive for the territory, counterpart or end-user base? The fifth is the local ownership test: does the modality allow appropriate localisation, workforce development and institutional embedding rather than indefinite external dependency? The sixth is the risk allocation test: are operational, financial, legal and reputational risks placed with the parties best able to bear and manage them?

A delivery model that fails these tests shall not be approved merely because it is familiar, fashionable or convenient. UASE is intended to embody evidence-backed transition rather than administrative habit. That doctrine has direct consequences here. In many cases, the most institutionally respectable modality on paper will not be the best if it requires capabilities, budgets or governance conditions that do not exist in the territory concerned. Equally, the cheapest delivery model in the short term may be impermissible if it externalises risk, weakens control, captures the public purpose or prevents long-term local ownership. UASE must therefore select modalities with a disciplined realism consistent with its wider founding doctrine.

The partner typology must be understood in parallel with delivery modality. Delivery is not only about structure. It is also about the character of the parties through whom execution is carried. UASE shall therefore distinguish between several classes of partner, each with different roles, rights, diligence standards and permissible influence. The purpose of this classification is to protect the alliance from confusion between counterpart, contractor, investor, strategic ally and implementing partner. One entity may in some cases occupy more than one role, but those roles must still be separately identified and governed.

The principal partner typologies under UASE shall be as follows.

Partner typology	General character	Typical role in UASE delivery	Core rule
Public Authority Partner	State, ministry, agency, REC, municipality, public utility, statutory body or other public mandate holder	Mandate counterpart, compacting party, regulator, co-deliverer, host, public owner or beneficiary authority	Public authority status does not exempt the partner from clarity of role, accountability and performance discipline
Programme Implementation Partner	Delivery-capable institution engaged to perform defined operational functions within a programme structure	Implementer, technical partner, service provider, local delivery entity, training provider, field platform actor	May support delivery but may not displace programme accountability unless expressly authorised
Strategic Anchor Partner	Institution or enterprise whose participation	Ecosystem builder, major operator, channel	Strategic value must not translate into



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	materially improves scale, credibility, access, ecosystem reach or investability	partner, industrial partner, systems integrator	institutional capture or exceptional treatment beyond approved policy
Financial or Capital Partner	Investor, lender, guarantor, arranger, catalytic capital provider, local finance institution, treasury interface or capital market participant	Funding, co-investment, risk-sharing, structuring, capital mobilisation, portfolio support	Capital support does not confer governance rights beyond the approved structure
Operator or Service Partner	Entity responsible for operating assets, systems, facilities or services under contract, lease, concession or management arrangement	Operational execution, service continuity, maintenance, platform management, commercial operation	Operator selection must be fit-for-purpose, performance-bound and reviewable
Knowledge, Research or Capability Partner	Academic body, training institution, professional platform, knowledge network or specialist centre	Research support, technical design, standards development, workforce training, evaluation support	Advisory or knowledge status does not create decision authority unless separately granted
Community or Local Participation Partner	Cooperative, local association, producer organisation, local enterprise cluster, workforce organisation or recognised community interface	Local uptake, legitimacy, access, mobilisation, user-side participation, community anchoring	Participation must be real and structured, not ceremonial or extractive

These typologies are important because UASE is intended to work across public, private and civic space without being captured by any one of them. A public counterpart may open lawful space, but it may not absorb the institutional identity of a programme. A strategic enterprise may be essential to delivery, but it may not buy informal constitutional influence through importance alone. A capital provider may structure finance, but it may not define the public-purpose standard. A local partner may anchor legitimacy, but it may not be burdened with responsibilities it cannot perform. The legal and operational discipline of UASE depends on role clarity.

The relatively self-autonomous nature of the programmes must be preserved in this architecture. A programme must be free, within approved limits, to build and maintain a partner ecosystem appropriate to its own mandate and delivery style. UASE-FP may require agricultural anchors, rural cooperatives, processors and logistics actors. UASE-DP may require systems integrators, digital public infrastructure providers and institutional technology partners. UASE-IP may require engineering, manufacturing, utilities and operating partners. UASE-SP may require education providers, employers and certification actors. UASE-MP may require commercial networks, business service platforms and



trade enablers. UASE-CP may require financial institutions, arrangers, guarantees and project preparation actors. Such ecosystem differentiation is not a problem. It is a necessary consequence of designing UASE as an alliance of serious programme-entities rather than as a generic central office.

At the same time, partner engagement remains bounded by common alliance rules. Every partner class shall be subject to due diligence proportionate to role and risk. Every material partner relationship shall be documented through an approved instrument. Every delivery structure must preserve the ability of UASE to enforce standards on integrity, safeguards, affordability, reporting and non-capture. The lead programme may select and manage the relationship, but it does not possess unlimited freedom to define institutional exceptions.

It also follows that not every partner should be a delivery partner. Some institutions are best treated as strategic endorsers, access channels, co-design contributors or policy interlocutors rather than as formal implementers. UASE shall resist the common error of converting every useful relationship into a contractual delivery role. Delivery partnerships should be reserved for cases where an entity is actually needed to perform, manage, finance or host a defined function in the approved execution model. This discipline protects both accountability and alliance simplicity.

The correct use of delivery modalities and partner typologies is therefore one of the central mechanisms by which UASE may remain lean while still being execution-capable. It allows the alliance to choose with precision when to lead directly, when to support, when to structure, when to supervise, when to co-govern and when to let others perform under disciplined terms. Without such precision, either the centre or the programmes will begin absorbing functions they do not need to hold, and the alliance will become heavier than its doctrine permits.

Chapter 5 shall accordingly be interpreted as establishing a rule of structured delivery pluralism under central institutional discipline. UASE is authorised to deliver through different lawful forms, but only where the delivery modality has been consciously selected, the partner roles have been clearly classified, the lead programme has been identified, and the central protections of the alliance remain intact.

Chapter 6 — Local Content, Jobs and Affordability Rules

UASE shall apply a binding doctrine of local content, employment effect and affordability across all six programmes. These are not secondary social preferences to be considered only if convenient. They are part of the public-purpose standard by which UASE distinguishes itself as an alliance grounded in social equity, private-sector activation, disciplined transition and practical delivery. A project that is elegant in design but weak in local participation, poor in employment formation or structurally unaffordable shall not be treated as a successful UASE intervention.

The first principle shall be that local value retention is the default rule. Unless a contrary case is approved on documented grounds, UASE programmes shall be designed and executed so that a meaningful share of labour, procurement value, maintenance capability, supplier participation, skills transfer, operating spend and economic circulation remains in the territory or market area where the intervention occurs. This principle applies not only to construction or physical delivery, but equally to services, digital systems, enterprise ecosystems, training platforms, food systems, preparation mandates and ongoing operations.

Local content does not mean crude localisation for symbolic purposes. It does not require UASE to prefer inferior, unsafe, corrupt or uncompetitive arrangements merely because they are local. The



proper meaning is that UASE must structure interventions in such a way that local firms, workers, institutions and market actors have a real route into participation, capability accumulation and economic benefit where this can be done without undermining quality, legality, safeguards or viability. Local content is therefore a design obligation, not a political slogan.

The second principle shall be that job creation and workforce transition must be treated as material outputs, not incidental side effects. UASE is not being constituted to move money and assets through territories without changing the social and productive condition of the people living there. Each programme shall therefore assess, at the preparation stage and again at commitment, what employment effects are expected from the intervention. These effects may be direct, indirect or induced. They may arise through construction, operations, supply chains, training, enterprise activation, public systems adoption, rural productivity or expanded market access. What matters is that the employment logic is made visible, measured and, where possible, intentionally strengthened.

The employment rule shall not be read narrowly. Permanent jobs are important, but they are not the only valid employment outcome. Transitional jobs, training-linked jobs, placement pathways, supplier formation, local service contracts, entrepreneurship support, cooperative participation, apprenticeships and workforce formalisation may all count where they represent genuine improvements in productive inclusion. UASE-SP will naturally carry a particular responsibility in this area, but the employment rule applies across the alliance. Infrastructure without workforce pathways, food systems without producer inclusion, digital systems without local capability, and capital mobilisation without jobs logic are all incomplete expressions of the UASE doctrine.

The third principle shall be affordability. UASE shall not promote or implement systems, platforms, assets or service models that are structurally misaligned with the purchasing power, fiscal space, operating capacity or maintenance realities of the environments in which they are deployed. This rule is especially important because institutional failure often begins not with poor ambition but with false affordability. Projects are launched on the strength of political will, donor enthusiasm, prestige procurement or imported standards, only to become expensive, brittle and socially inaccessible once the first phase of support has passed. UASE is expressly intended to avoid that pattern.

Affordability must therefore be assessed not only at the point of entry but across the life of the intervention. The relevant question is not simply whether a government, sponsor or investor can finance initial capital expenditure. The correct question is whether the resulting system, asset, platform or service can be operated, maintained, used and, where relevant, paid for over time without requiring unsustainable subsidies, emergency rescue, endless imported support or exclusion of the intended beneficiary base. UASE shall apply an affordability doctrine grounded in life-cycle realism.

This doctrine shall ordinarily require consideration of at least five matters. The first is capital affordability, meaning whether the initial investment requirement is proportionate to the expected value and financing structure. The second is operational affordability, meaning whether recurrent operating costs can be supported by the counterpart, user base, operator or revenue model. The third is maintenance affordability, meaning whether upkeep, replacement parts, servicing and technical continuity can be sustained locally or regionally. The fourth is user affordability, meaning whether the intended population, institution or enterprise base can reasonably access the service or output. The fifth is transition affordability, meaning whether the pathway from current practice to the proposed system is achievable without disruptive exclusion or dependency.



Because the UASE doctrine rejects prestige-heavy and administratively bloated models, affordability must also be linked to design simplicity. If a project requires a governance structure too complex for the operating environment, a vendor ecosystem too narrow for competitive resilience, a tariff or fee level too high for broad uptake, or a maintenance chain too dependent on external inputs, it shall be presumed non-compliant unless a strong contrary case is established. In other words, affordability is not merely a budget calculation. It is a system-design discipline.

The following table sets out the operative rules to be applied across local content, jobs and affordability.

Rule area	UASE standard	Practical implication
Local Content	Interventions shall be designed to maximise fit-for-purpose local participation in labour, suppliers, service chains, operations and capability transfer	Procurement, contracting and delivery design must create real local entry points rather than defaulting to external concentration
Jobs	Employment and productive inclusion effects shall be identified, strengthened and tracked where material	Projects should be structured to generate direct jobs, supplier work, workforce pathways, enterprise participation or capability-linked employment
Skills Linkage	Where feasible, delivery shall connect to training, apprenticeships, workforce transition or local capability formation	Programme design should avoid pure extraction of labour demand without building local competence
Affordability	All interventions must be proportionate to the fiscal, market and user realities of the territory concerned	Approval should not be granted to systems that are technically attractive but economically unsustainable
Life-Cycle Discipline	Cost assessment must include operation, maintenance, replacement and continuity, not only acquisition	Programme preparation must test durability beyond the launch phase
Local Ownership	Delivery should progressively reduce unnecessary external dependency and strengthen local operational capacity	Project design should favour handover pathways, embedded institutions and locally maintainable systems where possible

These rules shall apply differently across the programmes, but none of the programmes is exempt. UASE-FP must consider whether farmers, producer groups, local processors, logistics actors and rural labour markets are genuinely included in the value chain design. UASE-DP must ensure that digital systems are not so expensive, proprietary or externally dependent that they become unusable without continuous outside support. UASE-IP must test whether utilities, settlements or service platforms can be maintained and operated within local economic conditions. UASE-MP must structure enterprise activation in a manner that broadens access rather than concentrating opportunity in a small circle of pre-existing market actors. UASE-SP must align skills formation with real labour demand and productive



pathways. UASE-CP must avoid structuring finance around assumptions that make implementation financially elegant in theory but socially inaccessible in practice.

The local content rule also requires safeguards against tokenism. It shall not be sufficient for an intervention to cite local participation in general terms while reserving most value, most technical authority or most operating margin for external actors. UASE shall expect preparation documents and delivery structures to identify how local firms, workers, institutions and market actors enter the value chain, on what terms, with what capability support, and with what prospect of progression beyond low-value or ceremonial roles. Local content that exists only in public messaging shall not satisfy this chapter.

Similarly, the jobs rule requires safeguards against inflated claims. Employment projections shall be presented conservatively and by category where feasible. Distinctions should be made between temporary construction labour, operational employment, supply-chain work, entrepreneurial participation, training-linked opportunities and induced jobs. UASE shall not encourage exaggerated employment narratives merely to improve fundraising or public visibility. The alliance gains more credibility by under-promising and evidencing real labour effects than by promoting speculative numbers that cannot later be defended.

Affordability likewise requires safeguards against distortion. It shall not be acceptable to make an intervention appear affordable by ignoring maintenance, shortening replacement cycles on paper, assuming unrealistic user uptake, embedding non-transparent subsidies, or treating future donor relief as an implied operating model. If such assumptions are necessary, they must be made explicit and tested. The UASE approach demands financial seriousness. It is better to phase a project, simplify a design, localise a component, revise a delivery model or slow expansion than to approve a structure that will predictably fail under actual operating conditions.

There will, of course, be cases in which local content is initially constrained. A territory may lack qualified suppliers, key materials, specialist operators or institutional capability at the moment of entry. In such cases, exceptions may be allowed, but only on the basis of a documented transition plan. External sourcing may be justified for a period, but the intervention should still be designed to build local pathways over time wherever feasible. The exception must not become the hidden norm. UASE should be willing to import what is necessary, but it should not institutionalise avoidable external dependency.

The same logic applies to affordability. Some interventions may require front-loaded subsidy, concessional structuring, phased tariff support or temporary guarantee mechanisms in order to become viable. That is not prohibited. What is prohibited is the absence of a credible pathway from supported entry to stable operation. The Capital Programme may assist in structuring this pathway, but the substantive affordability of the end state remains the responsibility of the lead programme and the approving authorities.

The relatively self-autonomous character of the programmes also has an important role here. Each programme must be permitted to develop its own technical metrics, thresholds and design rules for local content, jobs and affordability within its field. The form these tests take in a digital systems programme cannot be identical to the form they take in a food systems or infrastructure programme. Yet programme autonomy does not dilute the alliance-wide obligation. Each programme must demonstrate, in its own way and through its own instruments, that the intervention strengthens local economic participation, supports productive inclusion and remains affordable in life-cycle terms.



This chapter shall therefore be read as establishing mandatory social-economy discipline within the delivery model of UASE. Local content ensures that value does not simply pass through the territory. Jobs rules ensure that delivery contributes to productive participation rather than abstract system change alone. Affordability rules ensure that what is built, financed or deployed can continue to function in the real economy to which it is addressed. Together, these rules are among the principal means by which UASE remains faithful to its wider doctrine as the maintained operating form of the ecosystem from which it arises.

Chapter 7 — Shared Services and Central-Spine Dependencies

The six-programme model of UASE depends not only on clear programme autonomy, but equally on a disciplined central spine capable of holding together those functions that must remain common if the alliance is to stay governable, credible, legally coherent and financially controlled. The doctrine of relative programme self-autonomy does not imply institutional duplication. It implies that each programme should be free to lead within its mandate while relying, in a structured and lawful manner, upon a shared institutional backbone for those services, controls and systems that should not be fragmented across the alliance.

This chapter therefore establishes the principle that UASE shall operate through a shared-services and central-spine model, under which the six programmes retain substantive operational autonomy in their respective fields but remain dependent upon a common set of reserved functions, enabling systems and institutional controls. This dependency is not a weakness. It is the mechanism by which UASE prevents each programme from hardening into a separate bureaucracy, separate legal order, separate treasury culture or separate institutional identity. Without such a central spine, the alliance would drift toward informal federation without discipline. With an overextended central spine, however, the programmes would be reduced to administrative appendices. The correct model is therefore one of central reservation of common order and decentralised programme execution.

Shared services under UASE shall be established for four principal reasons. First, they preserve constitutional unity across the alliance. Secondly, they protect quality, integrity, fiduciary control and legal consistency. Thirdly, they reduce avoidable overhead by preventing each programme from rebuilding the same back-office functions in parallel. Fourthly, they allow the programme-entities to remain specialist, lean and execution-oriented rather than being forced to become miniature institutions with their own fully duplicated support architecture. These considerations are not merely administrative. They form part of the strategic economy of UASE as a top organisation designed to remain slim, premium and operationally serious.

The central spine shall therefore hold, or supervise, the institutional functions that are common by nature, high-risk by consequence, or foundational to the credibility of the alliance as a whole. The programmes may interact intensively with these functions, shape service requirements and request tailored support, but they shall not assume that all common capacities may simply be rebuilt at programme level whenever desired. The default presumption shall be that common architecture remains common unless a justified exception has been approved.



The following table sets out the principal shared-service domains and the general allocation of responsibility between the central spine and the programme level.

Shared-service domain	Central-spine role	Programme role	Governing rule
Constitutional governance and reserved matters	Holds constitutional interpretation, reserved approvals, institutional authority mapping and governance-cycle discipline	Complies with the common order and escalates reserved matters when triggered	No programme may establish a parallel constitutional or governance regime
Legal, contracting and institutional formation	Maintains common contracting standards, legal templates, institutional formation rules and major legal risk oversight	Leads programme-specific deal structuring within approved legal frameworks	Legal individuality in practice does not authorise legal fragmentation in principle
Treasury, capital control and financial policy	Holds treasury policy, reserve discipline, capital architecture, ring-fencing rules and concentration controls	Manages approved programme budgets, pipeline finance logic and delegated spending within thresholds	No programme may operate an independent treasury doctrine inconsistent with UASE-wide controls
Integrity, safeguards and compliance	Maintains alliance-wide integrity standards, anti-corruption controls, safeguard doctrine and remediation pathways	Applies the standards in programme operations and escalates deviations or incidents	Programme autonomy does not extend to weakening alliance integrity requirements
Procurement architecture and vendor systems	Establishes common procurement rules, approved vendor structures and audit trail expectations	Runs programme-specific procurement within those rules and subject to the applicable thresholds	Common procurement discipline is mandatory even where sector-specific sourcing logic differs
Monitoring, evaluation, learning and data architecture	Holds alliance-wide results logic, disclosure standards, reporting architecture and core data interoperability rules	Generates programme evidence, reports results and may maintain specialist indicators within the common framework	No programme may operate as a closed reporting universe outside the UASE evidence order



Human capital, remuneration and capability framework	Sets common employment philosophy, ethics rules, remuneration boundaries and core capability standards	Organises programme teams, specialist roles and field structures within approved workforce policy	Programme staffing flexibility must remain consistent with UASE-wide human capital discipline
Communications, identity and external positioning	Protects the institutional identity of UASE, naming logic, hierarchy of representation and public narrative coherence	Undertakes programme communications within approved branding and positioning rules	No programme may create an external identity inconsistent with the alliance architecture
Compact registry and institutional partner control	Maintains authoritative records of compacts, institutional commitments and partner classifications	Uses the system for programme-level compacting and partner engagement	External commitments must remain visible to the centre even where negotiated by programmes
Shared operational support and administrative systems	Provides common systems for document control, records, approvals, internal reporting and selected back-office functions	Uses the systems and may request specialist modifications where necessary	Administrative convenience shall not justify system fragmentation

This allocation should be read together with a second principle, namely that shared service does not mean uniform service in all operational details. Different programmes will require different forms of legal support, different procurement pathways, different partner due diligence profiles, different reporting indicators and different staffing compositions. UASE-FP does not operate in the same practical way as UASE-DP, nor UASE-IP in the same way as UASE-SP or UASE-CP. The central spine must therefore be common in standard and authority, but adaptable in service form. A rigid central service that fails to understand programme realities would undermine the very purpose of the alliance.

For that reason, each shared-service domain shall be expected to maintain a programme-facing operating logic. The central legal function must understand sectoral structuring; the treasury function must understand different programme capital cycles; the data function must understand diverse evidence models; the procurement function must support specialised sourcing realities; and the communications function must allow sector-specific expression without diluting alliance identity. A central spine that cannot serve programme diversity becomes an obstacle rather than an asset. The duty of the centre is therefore not merely to control, but to enable.

At the same time, the programmes must not use sector complexity as a justification for institutional self-separation. A programme may establish specialist operational units, technical cells, sector-specific templates, approved expert rosters and dedicated implementation support mechanisms. What it may not do, without formal authorisation, is recreate for itself a separate treasury office, separate institutional legal system, separate procurement code, separate public identity, separate governance



doctrine or separate integrity framework. The alliance remains one legal and constitutional order even where it contains multiple serious programme-entities.

The dependency of the programmes upon the central spine shall also be reflected in approvals and escalation. A programme may originate, prepare and manage work within its mandate, but certain categories of action shall always trigger central dependence. These shall include, at minimum, actions that materially alter programme scope; actions that create substantial legal exposure; actions that establish new territorial standing beyond delegated limits; actions that affect treasury policy or capital concentration; actions that alter institutional identity or naming; actions that create unusual safeguard or reputational risk; and actions that involve transfer, expansion or restructuring of programme architecture. In such matters, the central spine acts not as a routine administrative checkpoint, but as the guardian of alliance order.

The shared-service model must also be designed so that programme success is not penalised. As programmes mature, some will accumulate larger pipelines, more complex partner constellations and more demanding field operations than others. The central spine must therefore be scalable. It cannot remain sized only for a conceptual alliance while programmes are already operating at serious volume. Shared service dependency is sustainable only if the centre is itself sufficiently capable. UASE should therefore build the central spine neither too large in advance nor too small for real use. It must be sized in relation to programme reality and strengthened as programme scale increases.

An additional distinction is important. Some functions are shared services in the ordinary administrative sense; others are central-spine dependencies in the constitutional sense. Shared services may include operational support, standard templates, systems access, back-office processing or central documentation. Central-spine dependencies, by contrast, are those matters without which the programmes cannot lawfully or credibly operate as UASE programmes at all. These include constitutional identity, compact recognition, capital control, integrity standards, reserved approvals and institutional representation. The first category may be partly decentralised or supplemented over time. The second category is intrinsic to the existence of the alliance and cannot casually be devolved.

It is also necessary to state that programme autonomy may in due course justify partial internal service cells. A programme with sufficient scale may require dedicated legal resources, embedded finance personnel, specialist procurement capacity, or programme-specific MEL support. Such embedded resources are permissible and may be necessary. They do not, however, become separate institutional authorities by virtue of their placement. They remain accountable to the common architecture and shall operate as part of a federated service model rather than as independent functional sovereignties.

The following table summarises the distinction between what belongs to programme ownership and what remains centrally reserved.

Category	Primarily programme-owned	Primarily central-spine reserved
Strategic and operational content	Programme design, sector methods, pipeline development, partner cultivation, implementation planning, technical standards within scope	Alliance doctrine, mandate perimeter, formal institutional architecture



Day-to-day programme management	Team leadership, work planning, delivery supervision, partner coordination, field adaptation within approved limits	Governance reserved matters, major institutional approvals, escalation and review mechanisms
Specialist delivery instruments	Programme manuals, sector templates, technical rosters, intervention models, workstream sequencing	Common legal instruments, treasury rules, compliance architecture, procurement law and identity controls
External engagement in scope	Sector-specific counterpart dialogue, programme compacting within delegation, ecosystem development	Institutional representation at alliance level, naming rules, overarching partner policy and corporate commitments
Programme evidence generation	Field reporting, specialist KPIs, operational dashboards, sector learning loops	Results architecture, disclosure standards, data policy and alliance reporting structure

The proper interpretation of this chapter is therefore that the six programmes are intended to be genuinely operational and strategically distinct, but not institutionally detached. UASE remains one top organisation. Its unity is maintained through the central spine; its effectiveness is carried through the programmes. Shared services and central-spine dependencies are the legal and operational mechanism that makes that duality possible. They allow the alliance to be decentralised where expertise and execution require it, and centralised where trust, coherence and control demand it.

Chapter 8 — Programme Expansion and Transfer Rules

The six-programme structure of UASE shall be treated as the active first-order architecture of the alliance. It is not provisional in the casual sense, and it shall not be diluted through informal additions, thematic side-doors or project clusters that slowly acquire programme status without formal recognition. At the same time, the six-programme structure is not to be read as metaphysically closed. UASE has been designed to remain disciplined at launch while retaining the legal and strategic ability to expand, refine, reserve, transfer or reassign programme architecture where institutional necessity, operational maturity or wider Creativa ecosystem logic later requires it. This chapter establishes the rules under which that may occur.

The first principle shall be that no new programme may arise by drift. Programme expansion is a constitutional act, not a matter of branding convenience or pipeline growth. If a thematic field becomes sufficiently large, continuous, structurally distinct and institutionally irreducible that it can no longer be adequately carried within the existing six programmes, the matter may be considered for programme expansion. Until such time, the default presumption shall remain that the six active programmes are sufficient and that interdisciplinary or cross-cutting matters should be managed through those programmes rather than through premature structural multiplication.

The second principle shall be that expansion must solve a real architectural problem. A new programme shall not be created merely because a field is important, fashionable, politically visible or externally fundable. The test is whether the matter in question possesses a sufficiently distinct mandate logic, partner environment, delivery form, risk profile, compacting pattern and capital architecture that continued placement within the existing six programmes would produce confusion, overload or



repeated boundary violations. UASE is intended to remain lean. Expansion must therefore be justified by necessity, not enthusiasm.

The third principle shall be that programme expansion and programme transfer are separate but related acts. Expansion creates an additional recognised programme within the UASE architecture. Transfer reallocates an existing field, mandate segment, delivery platform, organisational book, territorial portfolio or project category either from one programme to another within UASE, or from UASE to another authorised Creativa entity or sister platform where the field no longer properly belongs within the active alliance structure. Both acts require formal review because both alter the institutional map of responsibility.

The following expansion and transfer tests shall apply before any change of programme architecture may be approved.

Test	Question to be answered	Consequence if not met
Mandate distinctness test	Is the proposed field genuinely distinct from the active six programmes in purpose and operating logic?	No expansion; matter remains within existing architecture
Non-duplication test	Can the matter be carried through existing programmes without repeated overlap, conflict or internal competition?	No expansion unless persistent failure is evidenced
Scale and continuity test	Is there a durable pipeline, operating need or institutional function sufficient to justify programme status rather than project or platform status?	No expansion; use project, platform or programme sub-unit instead
Governance capacity test	Does UASE possess, or can it lawfully and prudently build, the central and programme-level capacity needed to govern the additional architecture?	No expansion until capacity exists
Capital and viability test	Is the proposed programme economically and institutionally sustainable within the UASE model?	No expansion until a credible viability pathway is established
Ecosystem fit test	Does the proposed programme belong within UASE, or is it more properly situated in another top entity or sister platform of the wider ecosystem?	Transfer or external hosting to be preferred over internal expansion
Phase-discipline test	Would activation weaken the six-programme launch model by crowding UASE phase one beyond its intended scope?	Activation deferred or prohibited

The formal process for programme expansion shall ordinarily begin with an architectural review. That review may arise from repeated classification disputes, sustained pipeline pressure, recurring use of exceptions, major territorial demand, or a strategic decision within the wider Creativa ecosystem. The review must identify the field at issue, explain why the existing six-programme structure is insufficient, assess whether sub-programme treatment would be adequate, and determine whether the matter



belongs inside UASE or elsewhere. No programme shall be permitted to campaign itself informally into new territory without going through this process.

If the review concludes that the matter should remain within UASE and that formal expansion is justified, a programme activation instrument shall be prepared. That instrument shall define the proposed programme's mandate, boundaries, dependencies upon the central spine, initial operating logic, relationship to the existing programmes, treatment of pre-existing pipelines, governance implications, capital assumptions and phase conditions. Only then may the competent UASE authority decide whether to activate the programme as part of the formal alliance architecture.

Within this rule-set, it is important to state expressly that UASE does preserve a forward-looking architecture for a potential seventh and eighth programme, but that these are reserved packages only and do not form part of the active six-programme launch structure. They exist as conditional institutional options, not as presently operating pillars. Their inclusion in the architecture is intended to preserve future clarity while preventing premature overcrowding of phase one.

The first of these reserved pathways is Reserved Package A — Humanitarian Transition and Recovery Platform. If formally activated at a later stage, it would enter the UASE system as a potential Programme Seven, but only if UASE itself, or another authorised Creativa entity operating in formal relationship with UASE, later assumes substantial responsibilities in humanitarian coordination, protection, transition support, recovery architecture or post-shock implementation environments. The rationale for reserving rather than immediately activating this field is deliberate. Humanitarian and recovery functions are institutionally dense, operationally demanding and globally dispersed in the present multilateral order. They should not be crowded into UASE phase one merely because they are adjacent to public-purpose work. Activation should occur only where necessity, legal readiness, partner legitimacy, safeguards maturity and long-term operating logic clearly justify it.

The second reserved pathway is Reserved Package B — Health, Community Services, Gender Architecture and Social Protection Platform. If formally activated, it would enter the architecture as a potential Programme Eight, again only on the basis of a deliberate constitutional decision and only if those domains are later absorbed into UASE or into another top entity or sister platform whose institutional scope can properly hold them. This field is equally significant, but its significance is precisely why it must not be casually folded into the launch architecture. Health systems, community services, gender architecture and social protection are broad domains that can easily overload an institution if taken on before legal mandate, delivery depth and governance capacity are fully ready. The proper rule is therefore reservation first, activation only upon demonstrated necessity and architectural fit.

For the avoidance of doubt, the existence of Reserved Package A and Reserved Package B shall not be interpreted as authorising informal pre-activation. No programme may begin operating as though humanitarian transition and recovery, or health and social protection architecture, are already recognised seventh or eighth programmes simply because future reservation has been acknowledged. Until formal activation occurs, any relevant work must be handled either through the active six programmes within their lawful limits, through temporary project structures, or through another authorised entity in the wider ecosystem where the matter properly belongs.

This distinction is especially important because UASE must remain disciplined in its early maturity. The six active programmes already represent a large field of action covering food systems, digital public systems, infrastructure and settlements, markets and value chains, skills and workforce transition, and



project preparation and capital mobilisation. To overload that foundation by importing additional institutional universes too early would weaken exactly the premium, lean and governable structure that UASE is intended to embody. Reservation is therefore not hesitation. It is a tool of architectural seriousness.

Programme transfer must be governed with the same care. A field, project class, organisational book, regional platform or operational function may require transfer where experience shows that it no longer fits its current programme, where another programme has become the more natural home, or where the wider Creativa architecture has developed a sister platform better suited to hold the mandate. Transfer may therefore occur in three principal forms: internal transfer between active UASE programmes, external transfer from UASE to another authorised Creativa entity, or re-entry transfer under which a field previously held elsewhere is later absorbed into UASE through approved expansion.

Internal transfer within UASE shall be used where repeated misclassification, structural overlap or programme maturation indicates that a mandate segment should properly sit elsewhere inside the six-programme architecture. Such transfer shall include clear provisions on counterpart notification, pipeline continuity, budget treatment, data continuity, staff treatment where relevant, and preservation of legal and reporting obligations already assumed. Internal transfer is not a licence to abandon difficult work. It is a tool for placing work where it can be carried more coherently.

External transfer from UASE to another top entity or sister platform shall be used where a field is of continuing importance but no longer fits the constitutional or operational perimeter of UASE. This may be particularly relevant in relation to the two reserved packages. If the wider Creativa ecosystem later establishes or designates another platform that is better suited to carry humanitarian, recovery, health, community-services, gender or social-protection functions, the proper response may be transfer or external hosting rather than immediate UASE expansion. UASE should not retain a field merely because it once touched it. It should retain only those fields that remain properly aligned with its architecture and doctrine.

Where a transfer is approved, continuity obligations shall be mandatory. The receiving entity or programme must be clearly identified; legal commitments must be mapped; partner expectations must be managed; data and reporting pathways must be preserved or formally migrated; any ring-fenced capital or treasury implications must be explicitly dealt with; and no transfer shall be deemed complete until responsibility, authority and accountability are visibly settled. UASE shall not permit shadow transfer, in which responsibility drifts away informally while obligations remain behind.

The following table summarises the principal architectural options.

Architectural action	Meaning	Typical use case	Approval standard
No change	Matter remains within existing six-programme structure	Cross-cutting issue can be handled through current programmes	Default position
Sub-programme or platform treatment	Matter is handled as a dedicated platform, facility or sub-architecture without creating a new programme	Important emerging field lacks sufficient distinctness or scale for full programme status	High but below full expansion threshold



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Internal programme transfer	Existing mandate segment moves from one active programme to another	Persistent misfit, better ownership elsewhere within UASE	Formal review and transfer decision
External transfer or hosted placement	Field is placed with another authorised Creativa entity or sister platform	Domain better suited outside UASE or reserved for later external holding	Formal review with ecosystem-fit determination
Programme expansion	A new formal UASE programme is activated	Distinct, durable, necessary field cannot be properly held elsewhere	Highest threshold and constitutional treatment
Reserved activation	Reserved Package A or B is formally opened as Programme Seven or Eight	Necessity, legal readiness and institutional fit have matured sufficiently	Highest threshold plus phase-discipline review

The doctrine of this chapter is therefore clear. UASE is neither frozen nor fluid. It is structured. Its six-programme architecture is real and active. Its future may include a seventh and eighth programme, but only through reserved and conditional activation. Its internal map may evolve, but only by formal review, principled transfer and disciplined constitutional decision. In that way, UASE preserves both present order and future adaptability without sacrificing the lean institutional seriousness upon which its credibility depends.