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MEMBERSHIP, COMPACTING AND CONTRIBUTION FRAMEWORK

*TO REGULATE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UASE AND PUBLIC AUTHORITIES,
MEMBER STATES, RECs, CITIES AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL PARTNERS*

CREATED BY

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Care to Change the World



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Membership, Compacting and Contribution Framework

Chapter One — Participation Classes and Institutional Categories

The purpose of the present framework is to regulate the formal relationship between UASE and the public and institutional bodies that may enter its architecture through membership, compacting or recognised participation. In the UASE model, participation cannot be left undefined, because ambiguity at the point of entry produces confusion in rights, dilution of accountability and long-term instability in governance. The alliance therefore requires an ordered system of institutional categories through which each participating body is recognised according to its legal nature, its public authority, its representative function and the scope of the relationship it may lawfully hold with UASE. This document and chapter sequence correspond to UASE 10 — Membership, Compacting and Contribution Framework in the uploaded register.

The first principle shall be that participation is class-based, not improvised. No state, region, city, REC, public institution, representative network or associated body should be admitted into the UASE architecture without being placed within a defined category. That category will determine the legal character of the relationship, the nature of the rights available, the responsibilities assumed, the form of compacting available and the level of constitutional standing recognised by the alliance. The purpose of classification is not exclusion. It is discipline. UASE is intended to become a credible institutional architecture, and credibility in such matters begins with the refusal to treat fundamentally different entities as if they belonged to the same legal and political class.

The second principle shall be that sovereign participation remains distinct. In accordance with your stated direction, countries should be treated under a UN-like membership logic. That means, in substance, that a sovereign state enters UASE as a state, not as a programme beneficiary, not as a donor category, not as a preferred investor jurisdiction, and not as a subordinate administrative client. State participation must therefore be recognised as its own primary class within the UASE order. The alliance may admit and work with many institutional forms, but only sovereign states possess international public character in the classical sense, and that distinction should be preserved rather than blurred.

The third principle shall be that regional and societal participation are real, but not constitutionally identical to state participation. UASE is not intended to reproduce only a state-centric order. It is meant to function through a wider and more modern coalition of public authority, regional coordination, institutional execution and organised societal participation. It follows that regional entities, RECs, cities, public mandate institutions and WOSL Group-based representational channels should all be capable of entering the UASE structure in lawful and meaningful ways. However, their participation must be recognised according to their own legal character and must not be confused with sovereign membership merely because their practical importance may be considerable.



On that basis, the participation architecture of UASE should be organised around six principal classes.

Indicative Participation Architecture

Participation class	Institutional character	Typical examples	Constitutional standing within UASE	Primary function in the UASE order
Member States	Sovereign states admitted in their public capacity	Countries entering UASE directly as states	Highest intergovernmental standing; state-class participation	To provide sovereign participation, public legitimacy, country mandate and state-level compact authority
Regional and REC Participants	Regional organisations, regional economic communities and comparable intergovernmental regional bodies	COMESA and other RECs, regional unions, treaty-based regional platforms	Regional standing, but not equivalent to sovereign state standing	To coordinate cross-border implementation, regional policy alignment and multi-state programme compacting
Cities and Territorial Public Authorities	Subnational public authorities with lawful mandate or implementation competence	Cities, municipalities, metropolitan authorities, provinces, local government associations where legally competent	Public-authority standing at sub-sovereign level	To support place-based implementation, local public-service integration and urban or territorial compacting
Mandated Public and Institutional Partners	Public or public-purpose institutions with defined legal mandates relevant to UASE	Ministries, agencies, statutory authorities, public funds, development authorities, public universities, designated implementation entities	Functional institutional standing only	To perform specialised execution, programme support, delegated implementation or technical cooperation



<p>WOSL Group Representational Channels</p>	<p>Organised societal and economic representation through the WOSL Group networks</p>	<p>Private-sector networks, charity and philanthropy networks, educational networks, organised citizen and community channels</p>	<p>Representational standing, but not sovereign or public-authority standing</p>	<p>To provide structured non-state participation, social legitimacy, mobilisation capacity and implementation linkage through organised constituencies</p>
<p>Associated and Observer Institutions</p>	<p>Other institutions recognised for cooperation, dialogue or technical alignment without full membership standing</p>	<p>Strategic institutional allies, observer bodies, specialist platforms, technical affiliates</p>	<p>Limited or observer standing only</p>	<p>To enable cooperation, dialogue, technical exchange or project-specific alignment without conferring full compact rights by default</p>

The first class, **Member States**, should be treated as the constitutional backbone of the membership order. If UASE is to reflect a serious multilateral logic rather than a project platform dressed in institutional language, then countries must enter in a recognisable state form. This means that a state should be capable of becoming a formal member or equivalent constitutional participant of UASE in its own right, with its status derived from statehood and formal admission rather than from the scale of capital offered, the volume of projects anticipated or the political convenience of the relationship. The UASE model should therefore avoid a donor-beneficiary distinction inside the state class. States may differ in contribution size, implementation readiness or regional weight, but the legal dignity of their admission should not be reduced to those variables.

The second class, **Regional and REC Participants**, is indispensable because UASE is not intended to operate only through isolated country channels. Many of the alliance’s programmes, and indeed much of its wider architecture, are inherently regional in practical effect. Corridors, food systems, value chains, digital systems, infrastructure platforms, skills recognition pathways and regional capital formation rarely stop at the border in the way that constitutional doctrine sometimes does. For that reason, regional entities and RECs should have a recognised place within the UASE system. Their role, however, must be properly defined. A REC such as COMESA should not be treated as a sovereign state, but neither should it be forced into the same category as a mere technical partner. It occupies a distinct intergovernmental and coordination position and should therefore be recognised as such.

The third class, **Cities and Territorial Public Authorities**, reflects the reality that implementation is frequently local even where mandate is national or regional. UASE must be capable of entering lawful and disciplined relationships with cities, municipalities, metropolitan authorities, provinces and similar public bodies where the substance of delivery requires place-based cooperation. This is particularly important in the context of infrastructure, settlements, public service systems, local market activation, skills delivery, social participation platforms and municipal public-purpose assets. A city should



therefore be able to enter UASE through a class appropriate to its public authority and not merely as an incidental project site.

The fourth class, Mandated Public and Institutional Partners, exists because many relevant public actors are neither states nor cities, yet still carry genuine authority, competence or execution value. Ministries, statutory agencies, programme authorities, public implementation bodies, regulatory institutions, funds, public universities and specialised authorities may all play indispensable roles in the UASE architecture. These bodies should not be granted sovereign-style standing, but they must be recognisable as lawful institutional participants capable of entering defined compacts or cooperation instruments within the limits of their mandate.

The fifth class, WOSL Group Representational Channels, is of particular importance in the UASE order because it allows organised society and organised economic participation to enter the architecture in a structured way without confusing representation with sovereignty. Under your instruction, WOSL Group is to function as a representational layer through its various networks, including those connected to private-sector actors, charities, educational actors and private citizens. That is an important constitutional choice. It means that UASE does not treat social and economic participation as an unstructured afterthought, nor as a loose consultative cloud without defined channels. Instead, it recognises that organised constituencies may and should enter through established representational routes. However, this class must remain clearly distinguished from state and public-authority classes. WOSL Group representation is socially and institutionally significant, but it is not a substitute for sovereign membership, treaty authority or public-law mandate.

Within this class, UASE may recognise several sub-families of representational participation, all housed through WOSL Group channels but differentiated by constituency. The principal sub-families may include private-sector and employer representation, charity and philanthropic representation, educational and research representation, and organised citizen and community representation. The benefit of this model is that UASE gains access to structured societal participation without needing to constitutionalise every constituent actor individually. The representational channel becomes the organising principle, while the underlying networks provide depth, mobilisation capacity and practical contact with the real economy and civil society.

The sixth class, Associated and Observer Institutions, serves a more limited but still useful purpose. Not every institution relevant to UASE should become a member, a compacting public authority or a formal representative channel. Some institutions may need to remain in a looser relationship of strategic alignment, technical cooperation, observer participation or project-linked collaboration. UASE should therefore preserve a category for associated and observer institutions whose relevance is real but whose constitutional or compacting role is intentionally limited. This allows institutional breadth without inflating the membership architecture beyond what governance can sustain.

A further principle should be stated with precision. Participation class determines legal posture, not institutional prestige. A state may sit in a different class from a REC; a REC may sit in a different class from WOSL Group networks; a city may sit in a different class from a public university. This does not mean that one category is always more practically important than another in every circumstance. It means only that the nature of the relationship is different and must be governed accordingly. UASE should resist the temptation to confuse public-law rank, economic importance, implementation utility and constitutional status. A disciplined architecture keeps those distinctions visible.



It is also necessary to state that not all classes require identical membership language. For sovereign states, the language of membership is appropriate and should be retained. For RECs and regions, the language of regional participation or regional compacting may be more accurate. For cities, municipal or territorial compacting may be preferable. For public institutions, the language of institutional participation or mandate-based cooperation may be more suitable. For WOSL Group channels, representational admission, recognised stakeholder participation or organised constituency standing may better reflect the true nature of the relationship. UASE will benefit from precision in this regard, because terminological inflation often becomes the first source of governance confusion.

In substance, then, this chapter proposes that UASE should be built around a layered but disciplined participation order. Sovereign states should form the principal intergovernmental class. RECs and regional bodies should enter as recognised regional participants. Cities and territorial public authorities should enter as sub-sovereign implementation authorities. Public and statutory institutions should enter as mandate-based partners. WOSL Group should provide the recognised representational route for organised societal and economic constituencies. Associated institutions may enter through more limited observer or cooperation standing where appropriate. Together, these classes create a membership and compacting order capable of reflecting both classical multilateral logic and the broader alliance architecture that UASE is intended to embody.

Chapter Two — Rights, Responsibilities and Compacting Options

Once participation classes have been defined, UASE must determine what follows from them. Classification without legal consequence is merely descriptive. The real work of institutional design begins when rights, responsibilities and compacting options are assigned to each class in a way that is coherent, proportionate and enforceable. This chapter therefore establishes the principle that participation in UASE is not a symbolic status alone. It is a rule-based relationship that confers defined entitlements, imposes defined obligations and is expressed through defined instruments of compacting.

The first principle shall be that rights do not arise from proximity, funding power or political familiarity. They arise from institutional class, formal admission, applicable instrument and lawful mandate. This point is essential. UASE must not drift into a culture in which those who contribute the most money, enjoy the closest informal relationship or appear most useful in the immediate moment begin to acquire rights that the framework has not expressly granted. Rights must be constituted, not assumed.

The second principle shall be that responsibilities are inseparable from participation. No class within the UASE order should receive standing without corresponding duties. A state that enters UASE does not merely acquire status; it assumes obligations of cooperation, good faith, institutional respect and, where relevant, contribution and implementation discipline. A REC that seeks regional standing must act within its lawful regional competence and not use the alliance to bypass member-state authority improperly. A city that enters a compact must honour local obligations, access commitments and execution responsibilities. A WOSL Group representational channel must uphold orderly representation and not confuse social voice with public authority. Responsibilities are not secondary to rights. They are the conditions under which rights remain legitimate.

The third principle shall be that compacting is the legal mechanism through which class becomes operative. UASE should not rely on informal understandings, political goodwill or broad declarations of partnership where the relationship is intended to carry practical consequences. Each participation class should therefore have one or more recognised compacting routes through which its relationship to



UASE is formalised. These routes need not be identical across classes, and indeed they should not be. A sovereign state should not compact with UASE in exactly the same way as a city or a stakeholder network. But every serious relationship should be anchored in a lawful and intelligible instrument.

The following table sets out an indicative rights-and-responsibilities architecture.

Participation class	Core rights	Core responsibilities	Principal compacting options
Member States	To seek admission as state participants; to participate in UASE's intergovernmental order; to enter country-wide or programme-specific compacts; to propose national implementation pathways; to be treated with sovereign equality in class standing	To act in good faith; to honour UASE constitutional and compact obligations; to designate competent focal authorities; to support lawful implementation conditions; to avoid conduct inconsistent with the alliance's public-purpose mandate	Founding accession instrument, state membership instrument, national framework compact, programme compact, host-country or implementation agreement where applicable
Regional and REC Participants	To enter regional participation relationships; to propose multi-state or corridor-level cooperation; to coordinate within their lawful regional mandate; to support alignment between UASE and regional agendas	To act within lawful regional competence; to respect member-state sovereignty; to avoid over-claiming authority; to facilitate coordination, data flow and cross-border execution where agreed	Regional participation compact, REC framework compact, corridor or cluster compact, regional implementation support agreement
Cities and Territorial Public Authorities	To enter local or city-based compacting arrangements; to access UASE support for place-based implementation; to propose municipal or territorial platforms; to align local assets and systems with UASE programmes	To provide lawful local authority participation; to support permits, land access, public interface, local execution conditions and community-facing cooperation where applicable	City compact, municipal implementation agreement, territorial service compact, project-specific local cooperation instrument
Mandated Public and Institutional Partners	To participate within the scope of their lawful mandate; to support specialised execution, regulation, service delivery, research, education or	To remain within mandate; to disclose authority and constraints accurately; to comply with reporting, integrity and programme	Institutional participation agreement, delegated implementation arrangement, programme



	technical cooperation; to enter delegated or supporting relationships with UASE	requirements; to perform agreed functions competently	cooperation instrument, technical or statutory cooperation compact
WOSL Group Representational Channels	To provide organised representation for private-sector, charitable, educational and citizen constituencies; to originate pipeline ideas through recognised channels; to participate in consultation, mobilisation and selected implementation support within authorised scope	To represent constituencies honestly and in orderly fashion; to avoid claiming sovereign or public-authority powers; to comply with UASE governance and integrity rules; to manage conflicts of interest and channel discipline	Representational recognition instrument, stakeholder participation compact, sector-platform compact, constituency cooperation agreement
Associated and Observer Institutions	To engage in dialogue, technical cooperation, observation or limited strategic alignment where recognised by UASE	To respect the limits of observer or associate standing; to avoid implying rights not granted; to support good-faith cooperation where applicable	Observer arrangement, associated institution agreement, technical alignment protocol, project-specific cooperation instrument

For Member States, the rights question is particularly important because this class anchors the intergovernmental character of UASE. A state entering UASE should have the right to be recognised as a state participant of the alliance, to participate in such intergovernmental or plenary structures as the wider constitutional framework may later define, to propose country-level compacts, and to enter programme-specific or national implementation pathways under UASE’s institutional disciplines. The legal and political dignity of the state class should be preserved. At the same time, state participation must not be treated as ceremonial. A member state should be expected to identify competent authorities, support the legal and administrative conditions required for implementation, honour agreed commitments and act consistently with the alliance’s doctrine and public-purpose order.

This is where the UN-like logic becomes particularly useful. A country should not need to become a donor in order to be treated as a real participant, nor should large states automatically acquire a qualitatively different class of membership merely because of size. UASE may later define differentiated contribution expectations or differentiated programme roles, but the state class itself should remain unified in principle. This strengthens legitimacy and avoids reproducing a hierarchy in which financial weight silently overrides constitutional equality.

For Regional and REC Participants, the position is different but still significant. A REC or regional body should have the right to enter a formal relationship with UASE where regional coordination, multi-state execution, corridor logic, policy harmonisation or aggregated implementation make that useful. This is especially relevant in sectors where UASE is likely to operate through regional market systems, regional food and logistics chains, cross-border capital mobilisation, infrastructure corridors or regionally aligned programme platforms. However, such bodies must act within their lawful competence. They



should not use UASE as a vehicle to exceed their mandate or to imply sovereign powers they do not possess. Their responsibilities should therefore include respect for member-state authority, disciplined regional coordination and honest representation of what they can and cannot lawfully commit.

For Cities and Territorial Public Authorities, the rights should be strongly linked to implementation. UASE must be able to compact directly with cities and equivalent territorial bodies where local delivery requires it. That may include urban service platforms, infrastructure and settlements work, local skills pathways, municipal digital systems, public-market activation, land-linked implementation or community-facing systems. Such authorities should therefore be able to propose city compacts, territorial compacts or project-specific local cooperation instruments. In return, they must assume the responsibilities appropriate to the local public role: enabling access, supporting lawful implementation, coordinating local interfaces, and ensuring that UASE projects do not remain detached from the public realities of the places in which they operate.

For Mandated Public and Institutional Partners, the essential principle is mandate fidelity. These bodies should enjoy rights only within the sphere of their competence. A ministry, authority, public university or statutory body may have an important role in implementation, policy support, regulation, knowledge generation or delegated execution, but it should not be allowed to acquire rights that exceed its legal mandate merely because it is helpful to the alliance. The responsibility side is therefore decisive. Such institutions must disclose their competence honestly, remain within it and perform their agreed role under the governance, reporting and integrity rules applicable to UASE.

The position of WOSL Group Representational Channels requires particular care because it is both innovative and potentially highly valuable. Under the architecture you have indicated, WOSL Group is not an incidental external stakeholder. It is a recognised representational layer through which major social and economic constituencies may enter the UASE order in organised form. That means such channels should have real rights: the right to be recognised as legitimate representational interfaces within authorised scope; the right to contribute to consultation, mobilisation and societal linkage; the right to bring forward ideas, partnerships and pipeline opportunities through recognised sectoral and constituency networks; and, where appropriate, the right to support implementation through the relevant WOSL-linked structures. Yet none of these rights should be confused with sovereign standing, public-law mandate or constitutional authority over state and regional classes. The responsibilities of this class are therefore equally important. WOSL Group channels must represent constituencies honestly, operate through disciplined internal structures, manage conflict-of-interest risks and never imply that social representation displaces public authority.

This distinction will be especially important in preserving the integrity of the broader architecture. UASE is clearly intended to embody not only classical public authority, but also organised participation from the private sector, charities, educational actors and private citizens. That is one of its strengths. But the alliance will remain governable only if these different forms of participation are not collapsed into one another. WOSL Group representation should thus be powerful in mobilisation, legitimacy, social reach and economic connection, while remaining properly differentiated from sovereign and intergovernmental authority.

For Associated and Observer Institutions, the rights should remain deliberately limited. Such institutions may be invited into dialogue, cooperation or technical alignment, and may in some cases be useful bridges to wider ecosystems or specialised knowledge. But observer or associated status should not become an informal backdoor to membership rights. UASE should therefore articulate such



relationships clearly, ensuring that participation remains cooperative rather than constitutionally inflated.

A further rule should be established across all classes: rights must be exercised through the appropriate compacting route. It is not enough for a body to belong to a participation class in the abstract. Rights become fully operative through an instrument. A state may be constitutionally admissible, but its programme rights still need to be reflected in a country compact or implementation instrument. A REC may be recognised as a regional participant, but its role in corridor implementation or regional alignment still needs to be written into a formal compact. A WOSL Group channel may be recognised as a legitimate representational interface, but its actual consultative, mobilisation or programme support role should be expressed through a participation or constituency cooperation instrument. Compacting is therefore the bridge between status and function.

Compacting options should also remain graduated rather than binary. UASE should not force institutions into an all-or-nothing choice between full standing and no relationship. Different classes require different levels of depth. A state may enter through constitutional membership and then separately conclude one or more programme compacts. A REC may enter through a regional framework compact without becoming the equivalent of a state member. A city may enter through a city compact linked to one geography or service area. A WOSL Group channel may be recognised through a representational compact limited to consultation, mobilisation or designated forms of programme support. This graduated approach allows the architecture to remain both serious and flexible.

It is also advisable that UASE distinguish between class rights and instrument rights. Class rights attach to the type of participant and define what kinds of relationship are available in principle. Instrument rights attach to the specific compact concluded and define what has actually been agreed in practice. For example, a REC may in principle be eligible for regional coordination functions, but whether it holds a specific corridor coordination role will depend on the instrument executed. Similarly, a WOSL Group channel may in principle be eligible for structured consultation, but whether it has a formal role in a specific national or regional initiative must depend on the governing compact. This distinction protects the architecture from over-interpretation.

Finally, the chapter should state a general constitutional rule: no class may derive from compacting what the framework has not made available to that class in principle. A city compact cannot silently create sovereign-style rights. A representational instrument cannot silently create governmental authority. An observer arrangement cannot silently become membership. A regional compact cannot nullify member-state participation. This rule is essential, because many institutional systems lose coherence not through overt change, but through the accumulation of instruments that quietly outrun the underlying order. UASE should prevent that from the outset.

In summary, this chapter establishes that participation in UASE must always carry a defined bundle of rights, responsibilities and compacting options appropriate to the institutional class concerned. States should enter with sovereign dignity and corresponding obligations. RECs and regions should enter with regional coordination rights and lawful limits. Cities and territorial authorities should enter as local public implementation actors. Public institutions should enter according to mandate. WOSL Group channels should enter as structured representational routes for organised social and economic participation. Associated institutions should remain limited unless and until a deeper status is expressly granted. Through this approach, UASE gains a membership and compacting order that is both broad enough to reflect its alliance nature and disciplined enough to remain governable.



Chapter Three — Contribution Types: Financial, Legal, Operational and In-Kind

If participation in UASE is to be more than symbolic, the framework must determine not only who may enter and on what basis, but also what each participating class may contribute and how such contribution is to be recognised, governed and valued. A serious multilateral and alliance-based architecture cannot be sustained merely on declarations of support. It must rest on identifiable forms of contribution that can be recorded, assessed, linked to obligations, and incorporated into the wider operational logic of the institution. This chapter therefore establishes the contribution doctrine of UASE and distinguishes between financial, legal, operational and in-kind forms of contribution, while preserving the principle that contribution alone does not alter constitutional class or generate rights beyond those lawfully granted under the applicable compact.

The first principle shall be that contribution is structured, not rhetorical. UASE should not rely on broad language of partnership where the actual content of participation remains undefined. Every meaningful institutional relationship must be capable of being described in terms of what is being contributed, in what form, under what conditions, for what duration, at what risk level, and to what end. This is necessary both for governance and for fairness. Without such discipline, one participant may offer a legally insignificant expression of goodwill while expecting the standing associated with a much deeper commitment. Another may provide real and costly support without receiving clarity as to how that support is treated within the institutional order. A contribution framework exists precisely to prevent such ambiguity.

The second principle shall be that contribution type must remain distinct from participation class. A state may contribute financially, but it does not become a financial actor rather than a sovereign participant. A REC may contribute operational coordination, but it does not become merely a service provider. A city may contribute land, permits and public interface capacity, but it does not thereby acquire national authority. A WOSL Group representational channel may contribute mobilisation, stakeholder access and social legitimacy, but it does not become a public-law institution by reason of that contribution. The contribution framework must therefore be understood as regulating what a participant brings into UASE, not redefining what the participant constitutionally is.

The third principle shall be that contributions may be mixed and layered. In practice, many UASE relationships will involve more than one form of contribution. A member state may provide legal recognition, policy support, counterpart staff and limited co-financing. A REC may contribute regional endorsement, policy harmonisation support, coordination architecture and convening capacity. A city may provide land access, utility interface, municipal approvals and local implementation services. A WOSL Group network may provide private-sector mobilisation, constituency reach, pipeline formation, training linkages and reputational support. The framework must therefore accommodate composite contribution packages while still requiring each contribution element to be identified separately.



The four principal forms of contribution should be understood as follows.

Contribution type	Core meaning	Typical examples	Principal governance concern	Basic treatment under UASE
Financial contribution	Contribution of money, finance, capital support or financial instruments	Membership-related payments, assessed or agreed contributions, co-financing, guarantees, catalytic facilities, budget support to agreed functions, project-linked counterpart funding	Whether the financial contribution creates inappropriate influence claims, conditionality distortions or dependency	Must be documented, valued, ring-fenced where necessary, and treated as financially significant but not constitutionally transformative by itself
Legal contribution	Contribution through legal authority, recognition, permissions, statutory access or juridical enablement	Host-country recognition, legal standing, exemptions where lawful, licenses, permits, statutory approvals, delegated authority, regulatory accommodation within law	Whether legal support exceeds competence or undermines institutional neutrality	Must be explicitly grounded in lawful competence and expressed through valid instruments
Operational contribution	Contribution through execution capacity, personnel, systems, facilities or implementation support	Seconded staff, implementation teams, data systems access, facilities management, programme coordination, municipal services interface, institutional back-office support	Whether operational contribution creates hidden control or blurred accountability	Must be tied to defined scopes, reporting lines and performance responsibilities
In-kind contribution	Contribution of non-cash assets, services, rights of use or practical resources with measurable value	Land use, office space, meeting facilities, vehicles, technical equipment, logistics support, training access, communications support, convening services, volunteer or expert time where appropriate	Whether in-kind support is overstated, poorly valued or used to justify disproportionate standing	Must be described with specificity, valued where relevant, and governed as a real contribution rather than an informal favour

These four categories should be treated as the base architecture of contribution within UASE. They are sufficiently broad to capture the full range of likely participation while remaining disciplined enough to prevent conceptual inflation. UASE should resist the temptation to create excessive sub-categories



unless operational need later makes that necessary. A lean contribution framework is preferable at founding stage, provided that the underlying compacts are precise.

Financial contributions will often attract disproportionate attention because they are the most visible and easiest to quantify. They may include constitutional or membership-related financial participation, programme support, co-financing for country or regional initiatives, support to shared services, participation in pooled mechanisms, guarantees, structured facilities or other forms of project and institutional finance. Yet UASE must be careful not to let financial contribution dominate the constitutional logic of the framework. This is especially important if the alliance is to follow a UN-like state participation model while also welcoming regional bodies, cities and organised societal representation. Financial contribution is important, but it must not silently become the basis on which institutional standing is informally re-priced. A state with modest means remains a state participant. A REC contributing regional coordination rather than large funding still retains regional relevance. A WOSL Group channel may contribute immense mobilisation value even where direct financial support is limited. UASE must therefore record and respect financial contributions without allowing them to distort class integrity.

That said, financial contribution should not be treated casually. It should be governed with high clarity. Every financial contribution should be identified by source, purpose, legal basis, restrictions if any, period of availability, currency, disbursement logic, reporting obligations and consequences of delay, reduction or withdrawal. Where funds are unrestricted, that should be stated. Where they are linked to a specific programme, geography or shared function, that should also be stated. Where funds are intended as stabilising support rather than transaction-linked capital, the distinction should be made clear. UASE should not permit vague promises of financial support to substitute for formal financial commitments. Nor should it accept financing terms that create hidden control, political dependency or disproportionate influence over institutional direction.

Legal contributions are in many respects more constitutionally significant than financial ones, even where they attract less immediate attention. UASE will often require legal recognition, permissions, approvals, institutional standing, access rights, delegated authorities or regulatory cooperation in order to operate effectively. A member state may contribute by granting the legal foundation necessary for country presence, programme implementation or a recognised operating interface. A city may contribute through planning permissions, land-related authorisations or lawful public-facility access. A REC may contribute through regional endorsement, procedural facilitation or policy alignment within its competence. A statutory authority may contribute through approvals, licensing or delegated implementation rights. These are not secondary gestures. They may determine whether implementation is possible at all.

For that reason, legal contributions should be treated as formal contributions in their own right. However, UASE must maintain strict discipline here. No participant should purport to provide a legal contribution beyond its lawful competence. No compact should imply that a public body may grant rights, immunities, waivers or authorities that it lacks power to confer. Legal contribution must therefore be tied expressly to competence, legality and formality. It is better to have a narrow but valid legal contribution than a broad and theatrically drafted one that collapses upon scrutiny.

Operational contributions will likely become central to the practical life of UASE. Many participating entities may be able to contribute implementation staff, coordination functions, office support, systems access, technical teams, service interfaces, local administration support, convening capability or other forms of practical execution capacity. In a lean institution such as the one UASE is intended to be,



operational contribution can materially increase reach without requiring permanent central expansion. This is especially relevant in country, city and regional contexts, and also in relation to WOSL Group channels whose value may lie substantially in mobilisation, stakeholder connection, programme support and ground-level execution linkage.

Yet operational contribution must be governed with care because it is one of the most common pathways through which hidden control or blurred accountability emerges. If staff are seconded, who directs them? If office or system support is provided, under whose protocols does it operate? If a public authority hosts an implementation unit, where does authority lie? If a WOSL-affiliated network provides mobilisation support, how are conflicts managed and reporting channels maintained? UASE must answer such questions explicitly. Operational contribution should therefore always be linked to role descriptions, reporting lines, duration, standards of conduct, confidentiality obligations, data rules and exit arrangements. Operational generosity must not be allowed to become governance ambiguity.

In-kind contributions often appear less formal but can be highly material. Land, buildings, office space, meeting facilities, transport assets, logistics assistance, training venues, communications channels, equipment use, specialised services, convening capability, access to beneficiary networks or expert time may all carry significant value. Indeed, in certain settings, an in-kind contribution may determine whether a project is feasible. UASE should therefore neither ignore nor romanticise such contributions. They must be treated as real inputs, capable of recognition and, where relevant, valuation.

However, in-kind contribution also requires discipline because it is especially susceptible to overstatement. A participant may present a notional facility or service as a major contribution even where the practical value is limited, conditional or difficult to use. UASE should therefore require adequate specificity. If land is contributed, its legal status, location, permitted use, access conditions, encumbrances and duration of availability must be described. If facilities are provided, their suitability, operating costs and control arrangements must be clear. If expert time is provided, the scope, quality and accountability of that support should be stated. The principle should be that in-kind contribution is welcome, but only where it is concrete enough to govern.

A further rule should be established. Contribution should be recognised without creating a direct exchange logic between contribution and constitutional weight. UASE must avoid any drift toward the proposition that more money means more legal standing, more land means more voice, or more operational support means a stronger claim over the alliance's direction. This is especially important in a framework that combines sovereign participation, regional coordination, local public compacting and organised societal representation. The value of the contribution may affect the scale of the relationship, the practical significance of the compact or the level of reporting required, but it should not by itself transform the underlying constitutional category of the contributor.

That principle does not prevent differentiated contribution arrangements. UASE may, and likely should, provide for tailored contribution schedules, negotiated burden-sharing, phased commitments, programme-linked support or class-specific contribution expectations. A member state may contribute primarily in legal and political terms during one phase and increase financial contribution later. A REC may contribute regional coordination rather than treasury resources. A city may contribute operational and land-related support rather than cash. A WOSL Group channel may contribute mobilisation, stakeholder reach and sector organisation rather than formal finance. The framework should encourage seriousness in all these forms while resisting any simplistic hierarchy in which only financial contributions are treated as truly meaningful.



For that reason, UASE may benefit from a contribution schedule annex in major compacts. Such an annex would set out, in a disciplined format, what each party contributes under the four contribution headings, the timing of those contributions, any conditions precedent, valuation approach where appropriate, reporting and verification requirements, and what constitutes material shortfall or non-performance. This would greatly improve compact clarity and would also reduce later disagreement about what was actually promised.

The framework should further distinguish between core institutional contributions and project-specific contributions. Core contributions are those made in support of the general relationship between UASE and the participant, such as constitutional participation, framework support, shared services support or standing institutional recognition. Project-specific contributions are tied to a particular programme, geography, asset, service or transaction. The distinction matters because remedies, visibility, reporting and renewal logic may differ accordingly. A participant might remain in good standing institutionally while failing to deliver on a particular project contribution; conversely, a participant might contribute significantly to one project without thereby altering the general terms of its institutional class.

The chapter should also recognise the importance of verifiability. UASE must be able to confirm whether a contribution has actually been made, whether it remains available, whether its value has changed, and whether any attached conditions have been honoured. Verifiability is particularly important for legal, operational and in-kind contributions, which are often less straightforward than financial disbursements. The alliance should therefore reserve the right to request supporting documentation, implementation evidence, updated valuations where material, and confirmations of continuing legal and operational availability.

In summary, UASE should adopt a contribution architecture built around four principal types: financial, legal, operational and in-kind. These forms of contribution should be capable of mixed use, should be linked to clear schedules and obligations, and should be recognised as meaningful without being permitted to distort constitutional class. Through this approach, UASE gains a disciplined basis for understanding what its participants actually bring to the alliance and how those commitments support the wider institutional order.

Chapter Four — Compact Structure and Standard Clauses

If the previous chapters establish who may participate in UASE, on what class basis, with what rights and responsibilities, and through what forms of contribution, this chapter addresses the legal instrument through which those relationships are made operative. UASE requires a compacting system that is sufficiently structured to preserve coherence across many jurisdictions and institutional types, yet sufficiently flexible to accommodate the practical differences between sovereign states, RECs, cities, public institutions, WOSL Group channels and associated bodies. The compact is therefore not merely a memorandum of understanding in decorative language. It is the formal bridge between constitutional architecture and operational reality.

The first principle shall be that compacts are the primary legal expression of institutional relationship within UASE. While some participation classes may also require admission instruments, accession documents or other constitutional acts, the compact remains the operative document through which the relationship is defined in practice. It sets out the parties, the class basis of the relationship, the purpose of the compact, the contributions made, the rights recognised, the obligations assumed, the governance arrangements adopted and the conditions under which the relationship may evolve, pause or terminate.



The second principle shall be that UASE should maintain a common compact logic across different instruments. This does not mean that every compact must be identical. A state framework compact will necessarily differ from a city compact or a representational participation compact. However, all such instruments should follow a recognisable structural grammar so that the institution remains legible, governable and capable of cross-comparison. Standardisation in this context is not bureaucratic excess. It is a condition of institutional memory and legal consistency.

The third principle shall be that standard clauses should be mandatory unless a deviation is expressly justified and approved. Many institutional systems fail because each new compact is treated as bespoke to such a degree that the underlying order begins to dissolve. UASE should instead adopt a set of standard clauses forming the minimum backbone of all serious compacts. Additional clauses may be added where necessary, and some clauses may be tailored to the participation class concerned, but deviation from the standard backbone should be controlled. A lean institution depends on disciplined precedent.

A UASE compact should ordinarily contain the following structural parts.

Compact element	Function within the instrument	Observations
Title and instrument type	Identifies the legal nature of the compact	Should state clearly whether the instrument is a state compact, regional compact, city compact, institutional participation agreement, representational compact or observer arrangement
Parties and legal capacity	Identifies who is entering and in what capacity	Must state the legal identity of each party and the basis on which it is authorised to sign
Recitals and context	States the institutional and factual background	Should be concise but sufficient to explain why the compact exists and how it relates to UASE
Purpose and scope	Defines what the compact is intended to do and what it covers	Must prevent over-interpretation by clearly stating the substantive reach of the instrument
Class basis of participation	Records the participation class or category of the counterparty	Important to avoid ambiguity between sovereign, regional, local, institutional and representational forms
Rights and responsibilities	States what the parties may do and what they must do	Should reflect the class-based framework rather than reinventing it in each compact
Contribution schedule	Describes financial, legal, operational and in-kind contributions	May be placed in the body or an annex depending on complexity



Governance and focal points	Establishes contact points, review structures and escalation routes	Especially important in mixed public-private or multi-layer participation settings
Integrity, compliance and conflict rules	Protects the institutional order of UASE	Should be standard across most instruments, with tailored additions where necessary
Duration, review and renewal	States how long the compact lasts and how it can be reviewed or renewed	Necessary for disciplined institutional management
Suspension, default and withdrawal	Provides consequences if obligations are not met or the relationship is interrupted	Links directly to the next chapter of the framework
General clauses	Covers notices, amendment, interpretation, language, dispute handling and entry into force	Helps ensure legal completeness and administrative clarity

This structural model should be understood as the standard architecture rather than an inflexible template. Its purpose is to ensure that each compact answers the same core legal questions even where the parties and subject matter differ.

The title and instrument type matter more than is often assumed. UASE should name instruments carefully because the title itself signals legal posture. A sovereign state should ordinarily enter through a state membership or state framework compact, not through language better suited to a vendor relationship or technical memorandum. A REC should enter through a regional participation compact or REC framework compact. A city should enter through a city compact or territorial implementation compact. A WOSL Group channel should enter through a representational recognition or stakeholder participation compact. Precision at this first level helps prevent later confusion as to the nature of the relationship.

The parties and legal capacity clause should be strictly drafted. It must identify not only the entities involved but also the capacity in which they sign. Is a ministry signing on behalf of the state, or only within its own ministerial competence? Is a mayor signing for the city under local authority, or is council approval required? Is a WOSL Group channel signing as a recognised network body or as an incorporated organisational entity? UASE should require proof of authority proportionate to the importance of the compact. A compact that is not validly entered is not a foundation; it is a liability.

The recitals and context section should not be allowed to become inflated prose. Its function is to record the relevant background: the institutional basis of UASE, the participation class of the counterparty, the public-purpose rationale for the relationship, and any relevant contextual matters such as regional agenda alignment, city implementation relevance or the role of organised representation. Recitals help interpret the compact later, but only if they remain clear and disciplined.



The purpose and scope clause is one of the most important in the entire instrument. It should specify what the compact actually does. Does it create general institutional participation? Does it authorise programme cooperation? Does it establish a city-level implementation platform? Does it recognise a representational channel for consultation and mobilisation? Does it govern a specific country or regional initiative? UASE should draft scope clauses with care because many institutional disagreements arise from compacts that state high ideals but fail to delimit actual reach.

The class basis of participation clause should be a distinctive feature of UASE compacts. This clause should state explicitly the class or category under which the counterparty enters the UASE order and should make clear that the compact does not elevate the counterparty beyond that class unless expressly stated in the constitutional framework. This is especially useful in a multi-layered architecture such as the one you are building. It ensures that a city compact does not accidentally read like sovereign accession, and that a representational compact does not quietly assume public-law authority.

The rights and responsibilities clause should set out the operative core of the relationship. It should not merely repeat general aspirations. It should state, with sufficient precision, what the counterparty may do under the compact, what UASE may expect in return, what boundaries apply, what reporting duties exist, and what standards of conduct must be observed. In many cases, these provisions will need tailoring by class. A state may have rights to propose national programme pathways. A REC may have rights to facilitate regional coordination. A city may have rights related to place-based implementation. A WOSL Group channel may have rights related to representation, mobilisation and stakeholder linkage. However, the clause should always be drafted so that rights and responsibilities remain symmetrical enough to sustain a genuine institutional relationship rather than a purely declaratory one.

The contribution schedule should ordinarily be attached as an annex or clearly set out in the body of the compact. This schedule should specify financial, legal, operational and in-kind contributions in the manner outlined in the previous chapter. It should state timing, conditions, responsible parties, valuation approach where relevant, and the consequences of material non-delivery. A properly drafted schedule turns abstract cooperation into governable commitment.

The governance and focal points clause is indispensable. Each compact should identify who within each party is responsible for the relationship, how meetings are convened, how decisions are recorded, how issues are escalated and what forum conducts periodic review. Without this clause, even substantively good compacts may deteriorate into procedural drift. This is especially true where the relationship cuts across programmes, jurisdictions or social representation channels.

The integrity, compliance and conflict rules should form part of the standard backbone of every serious compact. These clauses should address lawful conduct, anti-corruption obligations, conflict-of-interest disclosure, non-misrepresentation, respect for UASE's governance rules, and, where appropriate, confidentiality, data handling and ethical performance requirements. UASE should be particularly cautious to ensure that representational and operationally dense relationships do not escape these protections merely because they are framed in cooperative rather than commercial language.

The duration, review and renewal clause should reflect the real nature of the relationship. Some compacts may be open-ended in principle but subject to periodic review. Others may be fixed-term, especially where linked to pilot arrangements or transition phases. What matters is that the compact states clearly how long it lasts, how its continued suitability is reviewed, how renewal occurs, and



whether renewal is automatic, conditional or discretionary. UASE should generally avoid silent perpetuity. A disciplined institution should know when it is re-examining a relationship.

The suspension, default and withdrawal clause links directly to the next chapter and should be mandatory. Even where the relationship is cooperative rather than commercial, the compact must state what happens if obligations are not honoured, if legal authority is lost, if contributions are withdrawn, if conduct becomes inconsistent with UASE standards or if either party seeks orderly exit. These clauses are not signs of mistrust. They are signs of legal maturity.

The general clauses should complete the instrument with provisions on amendment, notices, language, interpretation, dispute handling, counterparts, entry into force and other housekeeping matters necessary for enforceability and administration. UASE should standardise these clauses as far as possible to reduce drafting variability across the compact portfolio.

A more detailed list of standard clauses may therefore be useful as a working baseline.

Standard clause	Why it should appear in most UASE compacts
Authority to sign	Prevents later dispute as to validity and competence
Purpose and limits of scope	Prevents expansive interpretation beyond what was intended
Class confirmation	Protects the wider architecture by preserving participation boundaries
Contributions and schedules	Makes the relationship measurable and enforceable
Use of name and representation	Prevents misrepresentation of UASE or of the compact's significance
Governance, reporting and review	Ensures the relationship is actively managed rather than merely announced
Integrity and conflict rules	Protects institutional credibility and operational fairness
Confidentiality and information handling	Necessary where policy, operational or constituency-sensitive material is involved
Compliance with law	Ensures all parties remain within lawful competence
No unintended transfer of authority	Particularly important in state, REC, city and representational relationships
Suspension, default and withdrawal	Provides controlled remedies and exit routes
Amendment and renewal	Allows change without informal drift
Dispute handling	Creates an orderly pathway for managing disagreement



Entry into force	Clarifies when obligations begin
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Particular attention should be paid to a clause that may be called No Unintended Transfer of Authority. In a framework as layered as UASE, this clause could become highly valuable. It would state expressly that the compact does not transfer sovereign authority, public-law competence, constitutional rank or institutional status beyond what the framework allows. Such a clause would help preserve the distinction between state membership, REC participation, city compacting, public institutional cooperation and WOSL Group representational standing. It would also reduce the risk that an operationally important compact is later used to argue for a broader constitutional role than was ever intended.

Another clause of significance is Use of Name and Representation. This should regulate how the counterparty may describe the relationship publicly, how UASE's name may be used, whether joint communications require approval, and what language is prohibited if misleading. This is especially important where WOSL Group channels, cities, public authorities or regional bodies may wish to present their participation in a politically or socially resonant way. UASE should welcome recognition, but only under terms that preserve accuracy and institutional discipline.

It would also be prudent for UASE to maintain a compact hierarchy. Not all instruments should carry the same weight or be allowed to override one another. A constitutional or founding instrument should outrank a framework compact. A framework compact should generally outrank a project-specific implementation instrument. A representational recognition compact should not displace a state framework compact. A city compact should not override national legal obligations. The hierarchy should be expressed either in the framework as a whole or within the standard clauses of each compact. This will become increasingly important as the architecture grows.

Finally, UASE should recognise that compact quality is one of the clearest indicators of whether an institutional system is serious. A weak compacting culture produces inflated announcements, unclear obligations, preventable conflict and diffuse accountability. A disciplined compacting culture, by contrast, allows a large and diverse alliance to remain legible over time. In that sense, Chapter Four is not merely technical. It is one of the practical foundations of governability.

In summary, UASE should adopt a standard compact architecture built on clear instrument types, disciplined clause structure and a protected backbone of mandatory provisions. Each compact should identify the participation class of the counterparty, define rights and responsibilities precisely, record contributions in measurable form, establish governance pathways, and preserve the constitutional order of the wider alliance. Through this approach, UASE can expand its relationships without dissolving its structure.

Chapter Five — Suspension, Default and Withdrawal

No serious institutional framework is complete unless it defines not only how relationships are created, but also how they may be interrupted, corrected, limited or brought to an end. This is particularly true in a structure such as UASE, which is intended to accommodate sovereign states, regional bodies, cities, public institutions, representational channels and associated entities within one disciplined order. Entry without exit produces fragility. Participation without consequence produces dilution. Compacting without remedy produces uncertainty. This chapter therefore establishes the doctrine and procedural architecture governing suspension, default and withdrawal within the UASE system. The chapter



follows the sequence set out for UASE 10 — Membership, Compacting and Contribution Framework in the uploaded register.

The first principle shall be that continuity is preferred, but not at any cost. UASE should always seek to preserve legitimate institutional relationships where correction, dialogue, cure or re-alignment remain possible. It is not in the interest of a growing alliance to terminate relationships casually or to treat every breach as existential. At the same time, UASE must remain capable of acting where a participant fails to perform, acts outside lawful competence, materially violates the compacting order, threatens institutional integrity or renders continued participation untenable. A framework that cannot distinguish between remediable disruption and material institutional failure is not a disciplined framework.

The second principle shall be that suspension, default and withdrawal are distinct legal conditions and should not be merged into one undifferentiated category of breakdown.

Suspension should be understood as a temporary limitation, freezing or narrowing of some or all rights, privileges, access or operational standing under the relevant UASE relationship, usually pending cure, review, investigation, re-confirmation of authority or restoration of compliance. Suspension is not, in itself, a final severance. It is a protective institutional response.

Default should be understood as the condition in which a party has materially failed to perform an obligation, maintain a required condition, honour a contribution, respect a governing clause or comply with a duty essential to the compact. Default may be curable or incurable. It may lead to suspension, remedial measures, renegotiation, limitation of rights, or in serious cases, termination or structured withdrawal.

Withdrawal should be understood as the formal exit of a participant from a UASE relationship, whether voluntarily, by operation of the compact, by expiry without renewal, by lawful termination following material breach, or through another agreed mechanism of exit. Withdrawal is therefore a concluding event or status, not merely a compliance problem.

The third principle shall be that measures must be proportionate to class, conduct and consequence. A late reporting submission from an associated institution should not be treated in the same way as a sovereign participant repudiating a core compact. A city struggling temporarily with an operational obligation should not be placed immediately in the same category as a participant that has concealed legal incapacity or materially misused UASE representation. The framework must therefore preserve institutional seriousness without encouraging overreaction.

The fourth principle shall be that no class of participant is exempt from consequence. Sovereign dignity, regional significance, representational reach, financial contribution or political usefulness must not become shields against governance. UASE may vary its response according to institutional class and context, but it must not tolerate the proposition that some participants are too important to review, suspend or correct. Such an exception would, in time, unravel the entire framework.



A useful way to structure the regime is through an event-and-response matrix.

Event type	Typical example	Initial institutional posture	Possible consequence
Administrative non-compliance	Failure to report, failure to designate focal points, late provision of agreed data, procedural omissions	Notice and cure period	Warning, corrective direction, temporary administrative limitation
Contribution shortfall	Non-payment, failure to deliver agreed in-kind support, non-provision of staff, withdrawal of promised facilities or legal support	Formal notice, verification and cure process	Adjustment of rights, suspension of related benefits, default finding if uncured
Mandate or authority failure	Loss of legal authority, signing beyond competence, change in public mandate, revoked approval or delegated power	Immediate review of legal validity	Partial suspension, compact amendment, or termination if the defect is material and irremediable
Integrity breach	Misrepresentation, conflict concealment, corruption exposure, misuse of UASE identity, unlawful conduct materially affecting the relationship	Protective escalation and immediate assessment	Suspension pending investigation, enhanced supervision, termination or exclusion where warranted
Material non-performance	Repeated failure to perform core obligations, refusal to implement agreed commitments, sustained obstruction of governance	Formal default process	Curative plan, stepped sanctions, suspension, termination or structured withdrawal
Voluntary exit	State, city, REC or other participant elects to leave the arrangement in accordance with its rights	Orderly withdrawal procedure	Exit, settlement of open obligations, transition measures and closure
Structural incompatibility	Institutional changes render the relationship no longer suitable, lawful or strategically coherent	Review and structured dialogue	Amendment, reclassification, non-renewal or negotiated withdrawal

The framework should further state that suspension is protective rather than punitive in its primary logic. It exists to preserve the alliance while allowing room for clarification, investigation, cure or orderly transition. A suspended participant is not necessarily expelled, dishonoured or permanently disqualified. Rather, the relevant rights of participation, compact execution or representational standing may be frozen in whole or in part until the matter is resolved. This is especially useful where facts remain disputed, authority is uncertain, legal changes are unfolding, or the risk of immediate continuation outweighs the cost of temporary pause.



Suspension may be full or partial. A full suspension may temporarily halt participation rights under the relevant compact, including governance participation, project initiation, access to UASE processes, representational visibility or certain programme-linked privileges. A partial suspension may be more limited. It may affect only specific programmes, specific instruments, specific territories, financial disbursements, visibility rights, or operational access pending cure. UASE should prefer partial suspension where the problem is bounded and the wider relationship remains salvageable.

The grounds for suspension should ordinarily include the following: material non-compliance with reporting or governance duties after notice; credible evidence of legal incapacity or loss of authority relevant to the compact; serious integrity concern; material failure to honour contributions essential to the relationship; repeated misuse of UASE’s name or status; conduct materially incompatible with the framework’s non-capture, public-interest or constitutional discipline; and any urgent circumstance in which temporary pause is necessary to protect institutional integrity pending determination.

Default, by contrast, should be a more formal determination. Not every problem is a default. Default should be reserved for failure of a material obligation or condition of participation. The key question is whether the failure goes to the substance of the relationship. If a participant has failed in a way that materially affects legal validity, delivery, institutional trust, contribution logic, governance credibility or the public-purpose basis of the compact, then a default process may properly be initiated.

The default process should be structured. UASE should ordinarily issue a written notice describing the alleged default, the relevant clause or obligation, the factual basis, and the period within which cure, explanation or contestation may be provided. The participant should then have an opportunity to respond, unless urgency or integrity risk requires immediate interim measures. Where the default is curable, UASE should define the cure required. Where the default is not curable in any realistic sense, the framework should permit a more rapid determination leading to suspension, termination or structured exit.

A distinction should also be made between technical default and material default. Technical default may involve breach of a formal requirement that is significant enough to require correction but not yet so serious as to undermine the relationship as a whole. Material default should mean breach of an obligation central to the legality, viability or integrity of the compact. This distinction allows UASE to remain firm without becoming indiscriminate.

The following classification may help.

Default category	Meaning	Illustrative consequence
Technical default	Failure requiring remedy but not yet destructive of the wider relationship	Cure notice, remedial plan, enhanced reporting, temporary limitation
Material default	Serious breach affecting legality, core contribution, integrity, public trust or essential performance	Suspension, formal determination, renegotiation, termination or structured withdrawal
Persistent default	Repeated or serial failure showing unwillingness or inability to comply	Escalated sanctions, narrowed rights, non-renewal or withdrawal



Incurable default	Breach incapable of real cure, such as fraudulent misrepresentation, fundamental loss of authority, or repudiation of the compacting basis	Immediate protective action and likely termination or withdrawal process
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Particular care should be taken where the participant is a Member State or Regional and REC Participant. In such cases, UASE must combine firmness with institutional maturity. A state or REC should not be treated as a contractor, and the language of remedy should reflect that distinction. Yet state or regional standing must not be allowed to neutralise governance. If a member state materially defaults on its compact, loses its lawful implementation basis, or acts incompatibly with core UASE obligations, the alliance must have a mechanism for protective suspension, structured corrective dialogue and, where necessary, limitation or withdrawal of standing under the relevant instrument. The same applies to a REC acting beyond competence or in a manner inconsistent with member-state balance.

With Cities and Territorial Public Authorities, the framework should allow greater attention to implementation reality. Local authorities often face operational fluctuations, elections, competence shifts and administrative change. UASE should therefore build in the ability to pause, adjust or reconfigure local compacts without automatically treating every disruption as institutional bad faith. However, where a city fails materially to honour land access, local cooperation, public interface obligations, legal permissions or integrity commitments, the compact must still be enforceable.

For Mandated Public and Institutional Partners, default is especially likely to arise around mandate overreach, under-disclosure of authority limits, weak performance or failure to provide the specialised function for which the institution entered the relationship. Because such participants often exist within larger public systems, UASE should preserve the ability to suspend or narrow the specific arrangement without necessarily severing all wider public cooperation.

For WOSL Group Representational Channels, the key risks are somewhat different. Default may arise if the channel misrepresents whom it speaks for, uses UASE standing to advance undisclosed private interests, confuses representation with governmental authority, fails to manage conflicts, or repeatedly breaches the governance and discipline requirements attaching to representational standing. UASE should be especially clear here, because the legitimacy of the broader architecture depends upon societal representation being structured, honest and bounded.

Withdrawal must be treated with equal seriousness. A participant may wish to leave for reasons that are neutral, strategic, legal, political or operational. A state may change policy. A REC may revise its engagement priorities. A city may decide that a local platform is no longer feasible. A public institution may lose mandate or capacity. A WOSL Group channel may restructure. UASE should therefore recognise an orderly right of voluntary withdrawal, subject to notice, settlement of outstanding matters and respect for transition obligations. Exit is not disloyalty by default. It becomes problematic only where it is abrupt, evasive or destructive of legitimate reliance without orderly process.

The framework should therefore require that voluntary withdrawal ordinarily be exercised through written notice, with a notice period proportionate to the class of relationship and the gravity of reliance. A purely consultative observer arrangement may require only limited notice. A state or REC framework compact, by contrast, may require a longer period, not because UASE seeks to trap participants, but because public-order and programme implications may need time to be managed.



A second distinction should be made between withdrawal from UASE generally and withdrawal from a specific compact or programme relationship. A participant may remain within the broader architecture while exiting one instrument, one programme, one city arrangement or one regional initiative. This distinction is especially useful in a layered institutional system, because it allows controlled retraction without unnecessary institutional rupture.

The legal effects of suspension, default and withdrawal should also be clearly stated. At minimum, the framework should provide that:

- accrued obligations survive to the extent expressly stated or necessarily implied;
- confidentiality, integrity, data, audit and record-retention obligations may continue beyond exit where appropriate;
- use of UASE name, insignia or representational claims ceases or narrows immediately upon loss of relevant standing;
- project, service or public-interest continuity measures may be required during transition;
- financial reconciliation, return of assets, release of premises, transfer of records or handover of responsibilities may be required where relevant;
- unresolved disputes do not automatically disappear by reason of withdrawal.

These effects are not punitive. They are instruments of continuity and closure.

A further principle should be that public-interest continuity must be protected during breakdown. UASE is not merely managing private bilateral relationships; it may be stewarding projects, services, platforms or institutional pathways that affect wider constituencies. If a city withdraws from a public-service compact, if a REC steps back from a corridor platform, or if a representational channel loses standing in the middle of an implementation cycle, the institution must be able to protect continuity insofar as practicable. This may include temporary substitute arrangements, interim governance measures, controlled public communications and transition planning.

The communication dimension also matters. UASE should preserve the right to state accurately that a relationship has been suspended, defaulted, withdrawn or not renewed, but it should do so with restraint, legality and precision. Public communications in such matters should not become theatrical. They should protect the integrity of the institution while avoiding unnecessary damage to legitimate counterpart relations, especially where cure, restructuring or re-entry remain conceivable.

The chapter should also recognise reinstatement. A suspended participant that cures the relevant breach, restores authority, corrects governance defects or otherwise satisfies the conditions of re-entry may be reinstated where the institution considers that appropriate. Reinstatement should not be automatic merely because a cure is asserted; it should follow verification and formal decision. Nonetheless, the possibility of reinstatement is important because it signals that the framework is designed to govern responsibly, not simply to exclude.



A concise procedural sequence may therefore be useful.

Stage	Typical content
Issue identification	Detection of breach, risk, failure or incompatibility
Preliminary assessment	Determination of seriousness, class, urgency and whether interim protection is required
Notice	Written description of issue, legal basis and requested response
Response and cure window	Opportunity to explain, contest or remedy where appropriate
Interim measures	Partial or full suspension, enhanced reporting, protective limitations if necessary
Determination	Finding of cure, technical default, material default, amendment need, suspension continuation or exit pathway
Transition or closure	Reinstatement, renewed compliance plan, structured withdrawal, termination or non-renewal as applicable

In summary, this chapter establishes that UASE must govern the interruption and ending of institutional relationships through a disciplined and proportionate regime. Suspension protects the alliance while preserving the possibility of cure. Default identifies serious non-performance and triggers structured consequence. Withdrawal provides lawful exit, whether voluntary or consequential. Together, these mechanisms protect UASE from informal drift, preserve fairness across participation classes and ensure that compacting remains a real legal order rather than a symbolic arrangement.

Chapter Six — Institutional Review and Renewal

If Chapter Five provides the framework for interruption and exit, the present chapter provides the framework for continuity, learning and disciplined continuation. No institutional relationship should be presumed to remain suitable forever merely because it was valid at entry. Circumstances change. Mandates evolve. Governments rotate. regional structures shift. Cities reprioritise. Public institutions gain or lose competence. Representational channels mature, fragment or reorganise. UASE itself will also change over time. It follows that the membership and compacting order must include a formal mechanism through which participation is reviewed, tested for continuing suitability and, where appropriate, renewed, adjusted or allowed to lapse.

The first principle shall be that review is normal, not exceptional. A review clause should not be read as a sign that the relationship is unstable. It is a sign that the relationship is serious enough to warrant re-examination. UASE should embed review into its institutional culture from the beginning. That will reduce defensiveness, strengthen accountability and make renewal a matter of evidence rather than assumption.

The second principle shall be that renewal is never merely ceremonial. It should be based on continued legal validity, substantive relevance, performance against obligations, integrity of conduct, and the



ongoing fit between the participant’s class, contributions and role within the alliance. Renewal should therefore be treated as an active determination, not as a rubber stamp.

The third principle shall be that review must be proportionate to class and exposure. A sovereign state framework relationship should not be reviewed in exactly the same way as a limited observer arrangement. A city compact linked to a major place-based implementation platform may require deeper review than a minor technical cooperation instrument. A WOSL Group representational channel with significant mobilisation influence may require more structured review than a small project-linked interface. UASE should therefore maintain both a common review doctrine and class-sensitive review methods.

The fourth principle shall be that review serves both accountability and adaptation. The point is not only to detect failure. It is also to identify whether a relationship should deepen, narrow, reclassify, diversify or evolve in order to remain aligned with UASE’s wider direction. Renewal should therefore be capable of confirming continuation, but also of supporting amendment or strategic adjustment.

A disciplined review framework may be structured around six core questions:

1. Does the participant still possess the legal capacity and authority required for the relationship?
2. Has the participant honoured the rights, responsibilities and contributions established by the relevant compact?
3. Does the relationship continue to serve a meaningful institutional, programme, regional, local or representational purpose within UASE?
4. Has the participant acted consistently with UASE integrity, governance and public-purpose standards?
5. Has the relationship created unintended concentration, confusion of class, mandate drift or overlap requiring correction?
6. Should the relationship be renewed as is, renewed with amendment, narrowed, reclassified, suspended from renewal, or concluded?

These questions may be translated into a review matrix.

Review dimension	Core inquiry	Typical indicators
Legal validity	Does the participant still have authority and competence for the relationship?	Mandate status, constitutional or statutory basis, authority confirmations, legal changes
Performance and compliance	Have obligations, contributions and governance duties been met?	Delivery record, reporting compliance, contribution fulfilment, meeting attendance, implementation behaviour
Strategic relevance	Does the relationship remain useful to UASE’s mission and architecture?	Programme fit, country or regional significance, institutional necessity, constituency relevance



Integrity and conduct	Has the participant maintained standards of probity, honesty and disciplined representation?	Conflict disclosures, misuse of standing, integrity findings, reputational developments
Institutional coherence	Does the relationship still fit its assigned class and boundaries?	Class discipline, overlap issues, overreach, representational clarity, mandate creep
Forward suitability	Should the relationship continue, deepen, narrow or end?	Renewal recommendation, amendment need, review panel conclusion

Review should occur at more than one level. There should ordinarily be instrument review, which focuses on the specific compact; relationship review, which considers the wider standing of the participant within UASE; and, where relevant, portfolio review, which considers whether the collective set of relationships within a class or geography remains coherent. This layered approach is particularly important where a state, REC or WOSL-linked channel may hold more than one compact at a time.

The timing of review should be defined with sufficient discipline. UASE may adopt different review cycles depending on the nature of the relationship, but the framework should establish clear expectations. A constitutional or framework relationship might be subject to major review at defined intervals, with lighter annual confirmations in between. Programme-linked, city-based or institutional compacts may require mid-term and end-term review. Representational channels may require periodic revalidation of constituency legitimacy and governance discipline. Observer relationships may require simple confirmation of continued relevance. What matters is that no significant relationship is left indefinitely without structured re-examination.

The following indicative cycle may assist.

Relationship type	Suggested review posture
State framework relationship	Periodic major review, supported by lighter interim confirmation
REC or regional compact	Regular review tied to regional mandate relevance and programme alignment
City or territorial compact	Review linked to implementation cycle, local authority continuity and operational performance
Mandated public institutional compact	Review tied to mandate validity, performance and continued functional need
WOSL Group representational compact	Review focused on constituency legitimacy, governance discipline, contribution value and boundary compliance
Observer or associated arrangement	Light-touch relevance and conduct review, with renewal only if continued value is shown

Renewal outcomes should not be binary. UASE should preserve a range of possible determinations. These may include: full renewal on existing terms; renewal with amendment; renewal subject to conditions precedent; partial renewal limited to certain programmes or territories; reclassification



where the relationship has evolved; non-renewal without adverse finding where relevance has diminished; or referral to Chapter Five procedures where review reveals a serious problem rather than a mere question of future fit.

The distinction between non-renewal and sanction should be kept clear. Not every relationship that ends has failed. A city compact may simply have completed its purpose. A public institution's role may no longer be needed. A representational channel may be reorganised into another form. A REC compact may have reached the end of a corridor phase. Non-renewal in such cases is not punitive and should not be communicated as though it were default. This distinction is essential to maintaining maturity in institutional relationships.

For Member States, review must be handled with particular care. A UN-like logic of state participation implies stability and respect in the treatment of state-class standing. At the same time, state-level compacts, contributions and implementation pathways should still be reviewable. UASE should therefore distinguish between the broader political or constitutional standing of a member state in the alliance and the performance or renewal of specific compacts under that standing. A state may remain part of the UASE order while one of its programme compacts is amended, paused, narrowed or not renewed. This distinction preserves intergovernmental dignity while protecting operational discipline.

For Regional and REC Participants, review should focus especially on mandate compatibility, regional relevance, coordination performance and the continuing value of the regional interface. Because RECs and similar bodies often operate in dynamic political environments, UASE should ensure that renewal is based on real present capacity rather than on institutional memory alone.

For Cities and Territorial Public Authorities, review should give particular weight to local delivery experience. Municipal relationships are often highly practical. Their value lies in whether place-based implementation has been enabled, whether local obligations have been honoured, whether continuity exists through political or administrative transition, and whether local public interface remains strong.

For Mandated Public and Institutional Partners, review should test whether the original specialised function remains necessary and whether the institution has continued to act within competence. UASE should be willing to narrow or conclude such relationships where function has become duplicative, obsolete or misaligned.

For WOSL Group Representational Channels, review should be especially disciplined because representational legitimacy is not static. A channel that was once an excellent vehicle for private-sector, charitable, educational or citizen representation may later become less coherent, less transparent or less aligned with UASE's boundary rules. Renewal should therefore test constituency reality, governance discipline, conflict management, contribution value and continued need. This is particularly important if WOSL-based participation is intended to serve as a credible organised-society pillar within the broader UASE order.

The framework should also establish review documentation as a formal requirement. Major relationships should produce a written review note or report stating the basis of review, the evidence considered, the findings reached and the renewal recommendation. This is valuable for institutional memory, fairness and future comparability. It also protects UASE against the tendency to let personal familiarity substitute for documented judgement.

Where significant amendment is proposed at renewal, the framework should require that such amendment be clearly linked to review findings. Renewal should not become an unstructured



opportunity to rewrite the relationship without rationale. If contribution schedules are changing, if class boundaries are being clarified, if governance rules are being strengthened or if the scope of the relationship is being narrowed, the reason should be stated.

A further principle should be that review should preserve the possibility of progression as well as contraction. A participant may have entered through a limited compact and demonstrated such seriousness that a broader or deeper relationship is now justified. A city compact may mature into a wider territorial framework. A WOSL-linked channel may prove capable of assuming a more structured mobilisation role. A public institution may become central to execution in a way not originally anticipated. Review should therefore not be thought of only as a filter for problems. It should also serve as the disciplined route through which good relationships deepen lawfully rather than informally.

The interface between review and the wider UASE constitutional order is also important. Renewal of a compact should not be used to alter matters that properly belong to higher constitutional instruments, unless the framework expressly allows it. Review may identify the need for broader constitutional change, but it should not silently implement that change at compact level. This protects the architecture against gradual, undocumented constitutional drift.

Finally, institutional review should reinforce one of the central themes running through the entire UASE package: that the alliance is designed to be lean, serious, disciplined and cumulative. That design depends on relationships being periodically tested against reality. Review is how the institution confirms that what once made sense still makes sense. Renewal is how it continues without stagnating. Non-renewal is how it makes room for coherence. Together, these mechanisms allow UASE to grow without becoming shapeless.

In summary, this chapter establishes that every meaningful UASE relationship should be subject to periodic review and deliberate renewal. Review should test legality, performance, relevance, integrity, class discipline and forward suitability. Renewal should be evidence-based, proportionate and capable of resulting in continuation, amendment, narrowing, reclassification or conclusion. Through this discipline, UASE preserves the integrity of its membership and compacting order over time rather than merely at the moment of entry.